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I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
Distributional issues have attracted considerable interest over the last fifteen years in Canada 
and in most OECD countries. In Canada, individual earnings inequality has risen since the 
beginning of the 1980s, at least among male workers (Morissette, Myles and Picot, 1994; Beach 
and Slotsve, 1996). In contrast, inequality in family disposable income has not increased 
between the mid-1970s and the mid-1990s (Wolfson and Murphy, 1998).  Whether wealth 
inequality at the family level has risen over the last fifteen years remains unknown. 
The goal of this paper is to fill this gap. Using data from the Assets and Debts Survey of 
1984 and the Survey of Financial Security of 1999 (Section II), we first document changes in 
average and median wealth between 1984 and 1999.
1 We find that both real average and median 
wealth rose during the period. Since older families tend to have accumulated more wealth than 
their younger counterparts, part of the observed increase in average wealth could simply be due 
to the aging of the Canadian population. Using shift-share analysis, we find that about one-third 
of the growth in average wealth can be attributed to the aging of family units (Section III).  
In Section IV, we show that wealth inequality has increased during the period. The 
increase in wealth inequality did not occur in a context where all segments of the population 
enjoyed increases in wealth: median wealth fell in the bottom three deciles of the wealth 
distribution but rose 27% or more in the top three deciles. Furthermore, only families in the 10
th 
decile (and in some samples in the 9
th decile as well) have increased their share of total net 
worth during the period.  
   In Section V, we describe changes in the wealth structure. We show that real median 
wealth and real average wealth rose much more among family units whose major income 
recipient is a university graduate than among other family units. Furthermore, both fell among 
family units whose major income recipient is aged 25-34 and increased among those whose 
major income recipient is aged 55 and over. 
In Section VI, we use re-weighting methods to examine the extent to which changes in 
family structure, changes in the age structure and changes in relative wealth by age and 
education of the major income recipient account for the growth of wealth inequality. We show 
that the aging of the Canadian population tended to reduce wealth inequality. Furthermore, we    5 
 
implement the semi-parametric approach proposed by Dinardo, Fortin and Lemieux (1996) and 
answer the following question: what would wealth inequality have been in 1999 if permanent 
income and other attributes of family units had remained at their 1984 level and family units 
had kept the net worth observed in 1999? Our results suggest that permanent income and other 
family attributes—as measured with cross-sectional data—are not major factors behind the 
growth of wealth inequality.  
In Section VII, we confirm these findings with regression-based methods. We attempt to 
quantify the contribution of changes in family units’ permanent income and demographics to the 
change in wealth inequality. We acknowledge that our ability to do so is limited by the fact that 
we are using cross-sectional data to explain a variable—wealth—which is best understood with 
longitudinal microdata. Using Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition methods, we find that neither 
diverging changes in permanent income nor diverging changes in socio-demographic 
characteristics explain a substantial portion of the growing gap between low-wealth and high-
wealth family units. 
We examine the extent to which some specific wealth components have contributed to 
the growth of wealth inequality in Section VIII. We show that, in a purely accounting sense, 
registered retirement savings plans (RRSPs) have, of all wealth components, contributed the 
most to the increase in wealth inequality.  
We conclude that differences—between low-wealth and high-wealth family units—in 
the number of years worked full-time, in the growth of inheritances, inter vivos transfers and 
rates of return on savings are likely to have played a major role in the growth of wealth 
inequality. In particular, rates of return on savings may have increased more for wealthy family 
units than for their poorer counterparts as a result of the booming stock market during the 
1990s. 
 
II.  DATA AND CONCEPTS 
2 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                          
1   The 1984 survey was not actually called the Assets and Debts Survey: it was just the asset and debt information 
collected in the May 1984 Survey of Consumer Finances. For the purpose of this paper, we refer to it using the 
term Assets and Debts Survey. 
2   This section draws heavily on Appendices A and B of “The Assets and Debts of Canadians: An overview of the 
results of the Survey of Financial Security”, Statistics Canada, Cat. No. 13-595.    6 
 
We use the Assets and Debts Survey of 1984 (ADS 1984) and the Survey of Financial Security 
of 1999 (SFS 1999). ADS 1984 is a supplement to the May 1984 Survey of Consumer Finances. 
SFS 1999 is a distinct survey which was conducted from May to July 1999. In both cases, the 
sample used is based on the Labor Force Survey sampling frame and represents all families and 
individuals in Canada, except the following: residents of the Yukon and the Northwest 
Territories; members of households located on Indian reserves; full-time members of the Armed 
Forces; and inmates of institutions.
3 Data is obtained for all members of a family 15 years and 
over.  
Some differences between the two surveys are worth noting. First, in ADS 1984, all 
information on components of assets (except housing) and debts were collected for each 
member of the family aged 15 years and over and then aggregated at the family level. In 
contrast, in SFS 1999, information on components of assets and debts were directly collected at 
the family level. Second, contrary to ADS 1984, SFS 1999 contained a “high-income” 
supplementary sample (consisting initially of about 2,000 households) which was included to 
improve the quality of wealth estimates.
4 The final sample of ADS 1984 includes 14,029 family 
units and that of SFS 1999 includes 15,933 units. Family units include both unattached 
individuals and families. 
It is well-known that the quality of wealth data is viewed as being lower than the quality  
of income data. This is largely because records of the current value of assets and debts are not as 
readily available as records of income. Also, the value of real assets (such as housing and 
vehicles) is judged to be of higher quality than that of financial assets. 
To make the concept of wealth comparable between the two surveys, we have to exclude 
the value of the following items from the 1999 data, as they were not included in the 1984 
survey: contents of the home, collectibles and valuables, annuities and registered retirement 
income funds (RRIFs). We define wealth of a family unit as the difference between the value of 
its total asset holdings and the amount of total debts. Our concept of wealth excludes the value 
of work-related pension plans and/or entitlements to future social security provided by the 
government in the form of Canada or Quebec Pension Plan or Old Age Security Systems. It also 
                                                           
3  Institutions such as penal institutions, mental hospitals, sanatoriums, orphanages and seniors’ residences. 
4    Having a high-income supplement in 1999 increases the precision of wealth statistics (average, median, 
inequality measures, etc.), compared to ADS 1984,  but leaves them unbiased (like those of ADS 1984).    7 
 
excludes the family’s human capital measured in terms of the value of the discounted flow of 
future earnings for all family members.  
One particularly difficult issue with wealth data is the measurement of the upper tail of 
the wealth distribution. Using a variety of data sources, Davies (1993) estimates that the share 
of total wealth held by the top 1% of family units in 1984 may increase from 17% (using ADS 
1984) to 22%-27% after making appropriate adjustments. Similarly, his estimates suggest that 
the share of total wealth held by the top 5% of family units in 1984 may increase from 38% to 
41%-46%.  
A further complication arises from the fact that, in this paper, we are comparing wealth 
at two points in time; the degree of truncation of the wealth distribution may change over time. 
More precisely, assume, for simplicity, that the true wealth distribution remains unchanged 
between 1984 and 1999. Extending the argument of Davies (1993:160) to the analysis of 
changes in the wealth distribution, if no Canadian family with wealth over $10 million ever 
consents to an interview in 1984, and if no Canadian family with wealth over $50 million ever 
consents to an interview in 1999, ADS 1984 and SFS 1999 will show an (incorrect) increase in 
wealth inequality which could simply be due to the use of better interviewing techniques in the 
latter survey than in the former.
5 For these reasons, most of the analysis conducted in this paper 
uses three different samples: 1) all family units (first sample), 2) all family units except those at 
the top 1% of the wealth distribution (second sample) and, 3) all family units except those at the 
top 5% of the wealth  distribution (third sample). For simplicity, we use the terms wealth and 
net worth interchangeably. 
 
III. CHANGES IN AVERAGE WEALTH AND MEDIAN WEALTH 
 
Table 1 shows average and median wealth for all three aforementioned samples. For all three 
samples, real median wealth grew by roughly 10% between 1984 and 1999. Real average wealth 
rose between 28% and 37%. Note that excluding the top 1% of family units lowers the growth 
rate of average wealth from 37% to 31%, indicating that the choice of the sample matters. The 
                                                           
5   Weighting procedures cannot correct this problem since no family with wealth over $10 ($50) million would be 
observed in the sample.    8 
 
growth in median and average wealth occurred despite an increase in the percentage of family 
units with zero or negative wealth.
6 
Financial wealth is a second concept of wealth which is useful for analysis. By financial 
wealth, we mean net worth minus net equity in housing and net business equity. Put simply, we 
define financial wealth as the stock of wealth left to a family without selling the house and the 
business. Financial wealth measures the stock of liquid assets a family could use relatively 
quickly to finance consumption following a substantial decrease in family income.  Median 
financial wealth increased by 27%-36% between 1984 and 1999 while average financial wealth 
rose at a much faster pace, growing at a rate of 53%-92%. As a result, the relative importance of 
financial wealth in net worth rose during the period.
7 
Table 2 shows that wealth increases with the age of the major income recipient, at least 
until 65. Part of the increase in average wealth observed between 1984 and 1999 could then be 
due to the aging of family units. Shift-share analysis reveals that between 30% and 39% of the 
growth in average wealth appears to be related to the aging of family units. The rest is due to 
growth in average wealth within age groups. 
 
IV. HAS WEALTH INEQUALITY INCREASED BETWEEN 1984 AND 1999? 
 
Since it is unclear whether family units should be the unit of analysis used when measuring 
wealth inequality (Davies, 1979), we consider, for each of the three samples, two different units 
of analysis: the family unit and the individual.
8  When individuals are the unit of analysis, 
wealth is divided by the number of individuals in the family.  
Apart from the Gini coefficient, we use two other inequality measures: the coefficient of 
variation and the exponential measure. While the Gini coefficient is sensitive to changes in the 
middle of the wealth distribution, the coefficient of variation is sensitive to changes at the top 
and the exponential measure is sensitive to changes at the bottom of the distribution. 
                                                           
6   Using the sample of all family units (first sample), the percentage of family units with zero or negative net 
worth increased from 11% in 1984 to 13% in 1999. Similar increases are observed for the two other samples. 
7   The share of average financial wealth in net worth rose from: a) 27% to 38%, b) 29% to 39%, c) 30% to 36% 
for the first, second and third sample, respectively. 
8   When using family units as the unit of analysis, an unattached individual with a net worth of $49,000 will be 
given a lower rank in the wealth distribution than a family of four with a net worth of $50,000. A different 
conclusion would be reached if  individuals were the unit of analysis, i.e. if wealth was divided by the number 
of individuals in the family.     9 
 
The Gini coefficient increased—between 4% and 8%— for all six combinations of 
samples/units of analysis considered (Table 3). Using bootstrap weights, we find that the 
increase is always statistically significant at the 1% level.
9  
For the sample of all family units, the coefficient of variation increases much more 
(35%), no doubt reflecting changes in the upper tail of the wealth distribution. For the first two 
samples, all three inequality measures show an increase which varies between 3% and 30%. 
However, for the sample excluding the top 5% of family units, the exponential measure 
decreases by 4%-7%. This implies that the 1999 Lorenz curve and the 1984 Lorenz curve cross 
in this case. 
In order to make rigorous statements about changes in wealth inequality, selecting a set 
of inequality measures is insufficient. The “real” test consists in plotting Lorenz curves for both 
1984 and 1999: if the 1999 Lorenz curve lies below the 1984 curve at all points of the wealth 
distribution, then analysts can say unambiguously that wealth inequality has risen. In contrast, if 
the two Lorenz curves cross, it is unclear whether wealth inequality has risen. In this case, it is 
always possible to find one inequality measure which will show an increase in inequality and 
another which will show the opposite conclusion. 
Inspection of the Lorenz curves (not shown here) for all six combinations reveals that, in 
general, these curves cross at the 1
st percentile, i.e. the 1999 Lorenz curve lies below the 1984 
Lorenz curve at all points of the wealth distribution except the first percentile. Hence, for the six 
combinations defined above, we cannot rigorously say that wealth inequality has risen between 
1984 and 1999.   
                                                                                                                                                                                          
 
9   We are not able to create bootstrap samples properly for the 1984 survey because we have only the final 
weights. The construction of bootstrap samples should use the original weights and other information on the 
details of the sample which are no longer available for the 1984 survey. While bootstrapping with the available 
information is doable, it would probably underestimate the true level of sampling error. We overcome this 
problem by noting that since the sample size for the 1984 survey was a little smaller than the 1999 survey, we 
can assume that the sampling error in the 1984 Survey is at least equal to and likely a little larger than for the 
1999 Survey. The standard errors for average wealth were published for the 1984 survey and can be compared 
to standard errors for comparable wealth estimates in the 1999 Survey. This allows us to compare the difference 
between the sampling error levels in the two surveys and create an adjustment factor if it appears necessary to 
estimate a higher sampling error for the 1984 survey.  Hence, we use the 1999 survey (bootstrap) sampling 
error levels to roughly estimate the error levels in the 1984 surveys. While this method is very crude, it is easy 
to implement and reflects the view that our ability to estimate sampling errors in the 1984 survey more precisely 
is limited. The adjustment factor is 1.08, indicating the standard error for average wealth in 1984 is 8% higher 
than its counterpart in 1999 (measured in 1984 constant dollars). To provide conservative significance tests, we 
assume that the adjustment factor is 2.0 (a doubling of the standard error in 1984). Even with these conservative    10 
 
However, this ambiguity disappears when we alter slightly these six combinations, i.e. 
when we further exclude the bottom 0.5% of the wealth distribution
10. In this case, the Lorenz 
curve for 1999 lies always below the Lorenz curve for 1984. As expected, all three measures of 
inequality now increase between 1984 and 1999 (Appendix 1, Table 2). Hence, when we 
consider 99.5%, 98.5% or 94.5% of family units, we can say that wealth inequality has 
unambiguously risen between 1984 and 1999.
11 This is the position we adopt in this paper.
12 
For all three samples, the choice of the unit of analysis does not appear to matter: the percentage 
changes in inequality obtained using family units as the unit of analysis are fairly close to those 
obtained when individuals are considered.
13 For this reason, the rest of the analysis conducted in 
this paper uses family units as the unit of analysis. 
While the aforementioned inequality measures provide a summary of the changes in the 
wealth distribution, they are not very intuitive. A simple way to look at changes in the wealth 
distribution is to compare growth rates of median wealth across deciles.
14 This exercise shows 
that real median wealth fell in the bottom three deciles but rose at least 27% in the top three 
deciles (Table 4). Hence, the increase in wealth inequality did not occur in a context where all 
segments of the population enjoyed increases in real wealth. 
  Only family units located in the upper two deciles (9
th and/or 10
th decile) of the wealth 
distribution have increased their share of total net worth during the period (Table 5). For all 
other eight deciles, the share of total net worth has fallen. These results imply that only family 
                                                                                                                                                                                          
assumptions, we find that the increase in the Gini coefficient is always significant at the 1% level (see Appendix 
1, Table 1).  
10  We refer here to the bottom 0.5% of the wealth distribution of family units. 
11  For all six combinations, the increases in the Gini coefficient observed between 1984 and 1999 when we further 
exclude the bottom 0.5% of the wealth distribution exceed by at most 0.3 percentage point the  increases 
reported in the third column of Table 3.  
12  One could argue that the growth in wealth inequality documented in this paper is spurious, i.e. simply reflects 
the fact that financial assets—which are predominantly held by the rich—are better reported in 1999 than they 
were in 1984. We address this issue in Appendix 2. We compare estimates of financial assets derived from the 
wealth surveys used in this paper with estimates derived from National Accounts. We show that, compared to 
National Accounts’ estimates, financial assets are less underreported in SFS 1999 than they were in ADS 1984.  
However, most of the increase in the Gini coefficient measured in this paper remains after implementing either 
proportional corrections or non-linear corrections which assume a greater degree of underreporting among 
wealthy families than among their poorer counterparts. Therefore, we conclude that the growth in wealth 
inequality documented in this paper is unlikely to be spurious. 
13  The only exceptions occur for the exponential measure which produces more pronounced relative differences in 
growth rates (between family units and individuals) for the samples excluding the top 1% and the top 5% of 
family units. 
14  Note that median wealth at the bottom (top) decile corresponds to wealth at the 5
th (95
th) percentile.     11 
 
units located in the upper two deciles have seen their average wealth increase faster than overall 
average wealth.  
Wealth inequality did not rise uniformly in all types of family units. As measured by the 
Gini coefficient, it increased much more among non-elderly couples with children and among 
lone-parent families than among unattached individuals and non-elderly couples with no 
children (Table 6). Results not shown confirm that this pattern also holds when we use the 
coefficient of variation and the exponential measure.
15 Among non-elderly couples with 
children under 18, real average wealth fell roughly 15% in the second quintile but rose about 
20% in the fourth quintile and even more in the fifth quintile (Table 7).  
 
V.  CHANGES IN THE WEALTH STRUCTURE: OVERVIEW 
 
The growth of wealth inequality occurred in conjunction with substantial changes in the wealth 
structure. Real median wealth and real average wealth evolved very differently for different 
family units. First, both rose much more among family units whose major income recipient is a 
university graduate than among other family units (Table 8). Second, both fell among family 
units whose major income recipient is aged 25-34 and increased among those whose major 
income recipient is aged 55-64. They rose even more among family units whose major income 
recipient is aged 65 and over. Third, both increased among Canadian-born family units and 
among foreign-born family units who have been living in Canada for 20 years or more but fell 
among foreign-born family units who have been living in Canada for less than 10 years. Fourth, 
both increased faster among non-elderly couples with no children than among non-elderly 
couples with children under 18. 
In many population sub-groups, real median wealth grew much more slowly than 
average wealth, likely reflecting an increase in inequality within population sub-groups. For 
instance, among family units whose major income recipient is aged 25-34, real median wealth 
fell 36% while real average wealth fell only 4%. Similarly, non-elderly couples with children of  
under 18 experienced essentially no change in their real median wealth but enjoyed an increase 
                                                                                                                                                                                          
 
15   Among elderly couples with no children or other relatives, inequality rose little except when we use the 
coefficient of variation and consider the sample of all family units.    12 
 
30% in their real average wealth (Table 9).
16  
Young couples with children under 18—i.e. those whose major income earner is aged 
25-34—experienced drastic changes. Their median and average wealth fell 30% and 20%, 
respectively (Table 9).
17 This decline in net worth has had non-negligible consequences: the 
percentage of these couples with zero or negative wealth rose from 9.5% in 1984 to 16.1% in 
1999. The decline in their median wealth led to a 39% decrease in their net equity on principal 
residence, which was partly offset by an increase in their median financial wealth.
18 
Among family units whose major income recipient is aged 25-34, the decline in real 
median wealth is unlikely to be due solely to a decrease in their real median after-tax income. 
The reason is that while the former dropped by 36%, the latter fell only by 7%.
19 However, 
growth rates of average wealth and average after-tax income diverge to a much lesser extent, 
being equal to -4% and 1%, respectively. Inheritances and inter vivos transfers (e.g. parental 
financing of education or of the down payment on a house) are unlikely to be a factor since the 
parents of the 1999 cohort are unlikely to be poorer than those of the 1984 cohort. Other 
potential explanations are discussed below. 
In contrast, the dramatic increase in real median wealth and average wealth (56% and 
51%, respectively) of family units whose major income recipient is at least 65 years old likely 
reflects a combination of factors: 1) possibly larger inheritances received by the 1999 cohort, 
compared to the 1984 cohort, 2) higher income from private pensions, and 3) higher income 
from the Canada and Quebec Pension Plans, from the Guaranteed Income Supplement and Old 
Age Security. 
                                                           
16  Couples with children under 18 are defined as couples with at least one child of the major income earner under 
age 18. 
17  The bootstrap standard error of median wealth in 1999 equals 2,666.69. Even if we assume that the standard 
error of median wealth in 1984 is twice as high, the difference between median wealth in 1999 and median 
wealth in 1984 is statistically significant at the 5% level. 
18  Median net equity on principal residence fell from $26,054  in 1984 to $16,000 in 1999. Median financial 
wealth rose from $7,157 in 1984 to $8,000 in 1999. 
19  As pointed out in section VII, this statement must be made with caution since changes in wealth depend, among 
other things, on changes in the set of annual after-tax incomes received in the past, not only on changes in 
current after-tax income measured by cross-sectional data. In other words, while current after-tax income 
dropped by 7%, accumulated after-tax income could have dropped by more than 7%.     13 
 
In sum, family units headed by new entrants to the labor market—i.e. young individuals 
and recent immigrants—have lost ground relative to older families.
20 Furthermore, within a 
given age group, families headed by individuals who do not have a university degree have lost 
ground relative to families headed by university graduates.
21  
 
VI.  WHY HAS WEALTH INEQUALITY INCREASED: USING RE-
WEIGHTING METHODS 
 
The substantial changes in family structure that Canada experienced over the last two decades 
may have had an impact on wealth inequality. Specifically, the growing proportion of 
unattached individuals and lone-parent families, which generally have lower-than-average 
wealth, could have contributed to the growth of wealth inequality. To assess the extent to which 
this is the case, we re-weight the 1999 data so that the relative importance of various types of 
family units is equal to that observed in 1984.
22 Then we calculate the inequality measures 
resulting from this re-weighting. The results are presented in Table 10. 
Whether changes in family structure tended to increase wealth inequality cannot be said 
with certainty. When all family units are considered, the impact of changes in family structure is 
ambiguous. Comparing columns 2 and 3 of Table 10, we find that applying the 1984 family 
structure to the 1999 data decreases the Gini coefficient and the exponential measure but 
increases the coefficient of variation (compared to their 1999 actual values). For the sample 
excluding the top 1% of the wealth distribution, wealth inequality would have been lower in 
1999 if the composition of family units had remained the same as it was in 1984. For this 
sample, changes in family structure account for 14%-22% of the growth in wealth inequality.
23 
                                                           
20 Morissette (2002) combines wealth data with income data and shows that between 1984 and 1999, recent 
immigrants have become much more vulnerable to income losses and unexpected expenditures. In 1984, of all 
persons living in immigrant families arrived less than 10 years ago, 16% were living in low income and would 
have remained in low income even if they had liquidated all their financial assets and added the proceeds to 
their after-tax income. This fraction rose to 26% in 1999. The corresponding numbers for all individuals living 
in Canada were 10% both in 1984 and 1999, compared to at least 42% for persons living in female lone-parent 
families. 
21  Since there is evidence that financial assets are better reported in 1999 than in 1984 (see Appendix 2), the 
growth rates of wealth observed for groups with growing wealth must be interpreted with caution. They likely 
represent an upper bound for the true growth rates of wealth of these groups. 
22  We use 14 categories to define various types of family units. 
23  The coefficient of variation one would have observed in 1999 if the 1984 family structure had prevailed equals 
1.498, rather than 1.517. Hence, in this case, 22% [i.e. (1.517-1.498)/(1.517-1.429)] of the growth in the 
coefficient of variation can be accounted for by changes in family structure.    14 
 
For the sample excluding the top 5% of the wealth distribution, changes in family structure 
account for 25% and 23% of the growth in the Gini coefficient and the coefficient of variation, 
respectively.  
The aging of the Canadian population may also have affected wealth inequality. A 
priori, its impact is unclear since it is associated with a decline in the relative importance of 
young families—who have lower-than-average-wealth—and an increase in the relative 
importance of older families, which tend to have higher-than-average wealth. To assess the 
impact of aging, we re-weight the 1999 data with the 1984 age structure, using the six age 
groups defined in Table 2. Columns 2 and 4 of Table 10 show that the impact of aging is 
unambiguous: had the 1984 age structure prevailed in 1999, wealth inequality would have been 
higher than it was in 1999. Hence, the aging of the Canadian population tended to reduce wealth 
inequality.  
Since real median and average wealth evolved very differently across age groups and 
education levels, it is worth measuring the extent to which changes in the wealth structure have 
induced an increase in wealth inequality. In the third and fourth column of Table 11, we ask 
what the level of wealth inequality would have been in 1999 if the structure of average wealth 
by age and/or education level of the major income recipient had been the same as it was in 
1984. To do so, we simply re-scale the 1999 wealth values within each age/education cell j by 
the factor Mj84/ Mj99, where Mj84 and Mj99 equal the average wealth of group j in 1984 and 1999, 
respectively.
24 Applying the 1984 wealth structure to the 1999 data generally tends to decrease 
the Gini coefficient (compared to its 1999 value) but generally tends to increase the coefficient 
of variation and the exponential measure. Thus, it is unclear whether changes in relative wealth 
by age and education (of the major income recipient) have contributed to the growth of wealth 
inequality. 
The re-weighting methods used so far are fairly simple but cannot be used when 
explanatory variables, such as a family unit’s permanent income, are continuous. Since wealth 
of a family depends, among other factors, on its permanent income, this is an important 
limitation. Fortunately, Dinardo, Fortin and Lemieux (1996) have proposed a semi-parametric 
approach which allow analysts to take into account the impact of continuous variables as well as 
of discrete variables.    15 
 
In the fifth column of Table 11, we implement this approach. We answer the following 
question: what would wealth inequality have been in 1999 if permanent income and other 
attributes of family units had remained at their 1984 level and family units had kept the net 
worth observed in 1999? The other attributes considered in this exercise are: age of major 
income recipient (5 age groups), education level of major income recipient (2 education levels), 
a lone-parent family indicator, family size, provincial controls and a rural-urban indicator.
25 
26 
For all three samples, our conterfactual inequality measures for 1999 are always higher than the 
actual inequality measures in 1999. This means that if the distribution of permanent income and 
other family attributes had remained at their 1984 level and family units had kept the net worth 
observed in 1999, wealth inequality would have been higher than it was in 1999. At the very 
least, this suggests that permanent income and other socio-demographic characteristics, as 
measured with cross-sectional data, are not major factors behind the growth of wealth 
inequality. In the next section, we confirm this finding using regression-based methods. 
 
VII. WHY HAS WEALTH INEQUALITY INCREASED: USING REGRESSION-
BASED METHODS 
  
In this section, we move away from the concept of inequality (where greater inequality implies 
that the 1999 Lorenz curve would lie below the 1984 Lorenz curve at all points of the wealth 
distribution) and ask the following question: why has the average wealth of low-wealth family 
units grown at a smaller rate than the average wealth of wealthier family units?  To do so, we 
use regression-based methods. 
                                                                                                                                                                                          
24  When doing so, we hold constant wealth inequality within age/education cells but allow average wealth to 
change for the whole population. 
25  We define a family unit’s permanent income as the predicted income of this unit when the major income 
recipient is aged 45 and the spouse (if present) age is set equal to what his/her age would be when the major 
income recipient is aged 45. See next section for further details. 
26  To implement this approach, we first pool the 1984 and 1999 data. Second, we estimate a logit model where the 
dependent variable equals 1 if  a family unit with a given level of permanent income and other given attributes 
is observed in 1984, 0 if it is observed in 1999. Third, we re-weight the 1999 data by the factor 
(Pi84/Pi99)*(K99/K84), where Pi84 and Pi99  are the probability of family i being observed in 1984 and 1999, 
respectively, K99 and K84 are the sum of weights for 1999 and 1984, respectively. Fourth, after re-weighting the 
1999 data, we calculate the counterfactual inequality measures. The explanatory variables used in the logit 
model include permanent income and other attributes defined above.  
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VII.1 Empirical Framework 
Consider the stock of wealth of family unit i at the beginning of period T, WiT. Wealth at the 
beginning of period T is a function of the following variables: 
 
(1) WiT = f(Wi0, IViT-1, YiT-1,  riT-1, ZiT-1)    
 
where Wi0  is the inheritance of family unit i at t=0, IViT-1 are inter vivos transfers received in 
the past,  (from t= 0 to t=T-1), YiT-1 is a vector of past annual incomes, riT is a vector of past 
annual rates of return on the family unit’s savings and ZiT-1 is a vector of socio-demographic 
variables (e.g. age of major income recipient, family size, lone parent status) which may have 
affected the savings rate of family unit i in the past.   
Equation (1) implies that the stock of wealth of family unit i at the beginning of period T 
depends on the set of incomes, inter vivos transfers and rates of return obtained in the past and 
on the demographic history of family unit i.
27 This means that the ideal data set to analyze 
equation (1) would consist of longitudinal data allowing the analyst to follow family unit i from 
t = 0 to t = T-1. In other words, to fully understand the stock of wealth of family unit i in 1984 
(1999), we would ideally use information on the vector of incomes, inter vivos transfers and 
rates of return obtained by this family unit prior to 1984 (1999) as well as information on 
inheritances and the demographic history of this family unit.
28  
Given that no such Canadian longitudinal data sets exist, we follow the methodology 
used by Blau and Graham (1990) and Menchik and Jianakoplos (1997) to study black-white 
wealth differentials and apply it to the investigation of the causes of the growth in wealth 
inequality. First, we specify the following wealth equation: 
(2) lnWit =  α0 + Yit*β1 + Zit*β2 + uit         
                                                           
27  Note that the rates of return obtained in the past, riT-1, depend on the share of total assets allocated to risky assets 
in the past,  i.e. from t=0 to t=T-1 (SHT-1): on average, families who allocated a larger share of their portfolio to 
risky assets are likely to have experienced higher rates of return. This suggests that a wealth regression could 
include the share of total assets allocated to risky assets in the past, i.e. prior to 1984 and 1999. Unfortunately, 
the Assets and Debts Survey of 1984 and the Survey of Financial Security of 1999 contain no such information. 
Menchik and Jianakoplos (1997) use longitudinal data from the 1976 National Longitudinal Survey of Mature 
Men to calculate a household-specific rate of return received in the past. As expected, this variable has a 
positive and statistically significant effect in their wealth regression. Blau and Graham (1990) and Altonji et al. 
(2000) include no controls for rates of return in their wealth equations. 
28  An example of this approach is the study by Gittleman and Wolff (2000) who use longitudinal data from the 
Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) to follow families over time.    17 
 
 
where lnWit is the natural logarithm of net worth of family unit i at year t, Yit is a vector of a 
family unit’s permanent and transitory income, Zit is a vector of socio-demographic 
characteristics which may affect a family unit’s savings rate, and uit is a normally distributed 
random term. We define a family unit’s permanent income as the predicted income of this unit 
when the major income recipient is aged 45 and the spouse (if present) age is set equal to what 
his/her age would be when the major income recipient is aged 45.
29  
 
Defining wit = lnWit, we rewrite equation (2) in a more compact form: 
 
(3) wit = Xit*β + ui t            
 
where Xit combines the two vectors Yit and Zit. 
 
Second, using the standard Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition, we note that: 
 
Equation (4) indicates that the change in average log wealth between 1984 and 1999 for family 
units of group j (e.g. low-wealth family units) is the sum of two components. The first 
component on the right of (4) is the part of the growth in wealth of this group attributable to 
changes over time in the mean characteristics of the group. The second component is the part 
due to differences in the returns to these characteristics as well as differences in the constant 
                                                                                                                                                                                          
 
29  Since current income may not be a very good proxy for the lifetime or permanent income upon which savings 
decisions are based, we follow Blau and Graham (1990) and Menchik and Jianakoplos (1997) and estimate 
wealth regressions with measures of permanent and transitory income. To estimate permanent income, we first 
regress after-tax family income on: 1) a vector of age dummy variables for the major income recipient [less than 
30, 30-44, 45-54, 55-64 and 65 and over], 2) education of the major income recipient [not a university graduate, 
university graduate], 3) a variable distinguishing singles from couples and classifying couples by age and 
education level of the spouse [male neither married nor living common-law, female neither married nor living 
common-law and 12 types of couples (six age categories for the age of the spouse times 2 categories for the 
education of the spouse)], 4) provincial controls and, 5) urban-rural status. Permanent income is set equal to 
predicted income evaluated at age of major income recipient equal to 45 (the spouse’s age is set equal to what 
his/her age would be when the major income recipient was 45). Transitory income is defined as the difference 
between observed income and predicted income evaluated at the actual age of the major income recipient and of 
his/her spouse. Altonji et al. (2000) take advantage of the longitudinal nature of the Panel Study of Income 
Dynamics (PSID) and estimate permanent income using panel data regressions. 
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terms. Applying (4) to both low-wealth and high-wealth family units, the difference between the 
growth rate of wealth of high-wealth family units (h) and the growth rate of wealth of low-
wealth family units (l) can be expressed as follows
30 : 
 
The first line of equation (5) is the difference between the change over time in average 
log wealth of high-wealth family units and that of low-wealth family units. The component on 
the second line of (5) is the portion of this difference due to changes in relative mean 
characteristics across groups of family units (i.e. relative changes in the composition of the 
population), weighted at group-specific 1999 coefficients. This component allows us to measure 
the degree to which differences in the growth of permanent/transitory income (or other socio-
demographic characteristics) account for the growth in the wealth gap between low-wealth and 
high-wealth family units. The second component, defined on the third line of (5), is the change 
due to variation in the relative returns to these characteristics across groups of family units, 
weighted by group-specific 1984 means of the explanatory variables. Equation (5) can also be 
rewritten in an equivalent way by weighting the second line of (5) at group-specific 1984 
coefficients and the third line of (5) at group-specific 1999 means of the explanatory variables. 
To perform this decomposition, we estimate equation (2) separately for low-wealth and 
high-wealth family units and for each of the years 1984 and 1999. The dependent variable we 
first select is the natural logarithm of net worth of a family unit (in 1999 constant dollars). The 
explanatory variables in the wealth regressions include permanent income, transitory income, 
age of major income recipient (5 age groups), education level of major income recipient (2 
education levels), a lone-parent family indicator, family size, provincial controls and a rural-
urban indicator.
31 Low-wealth family units are defined as those located between the 15
th and the 
                                                                                                                                                                                          
 
30  Baker et al. (1995) perform this decomposition to analyze the change in the gender wage gap over time. 
31  Education is included as a potential factor that may affect a family’s savings rate. Changes in the coding of the 
education variable between 1984 and 1999 imply that only the two following educational categories are 
consistent over time: 1) individuals with less than a university degree, and 2) university graduates. The lone-
parent family indicator is used to capture the negative impact of child care expenditures on lone-parent families’ 
savings rate. For a given level of income, larger family size likely increases consumption expenditures and 
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50
th percentile of the wealth distribution. High-wealth family units are defined in two different 
ways: 1) those located between the 50
th and the 85
th percentile and, 2) those located between the 
60
th and the 95
th percentile of the wealth distribution. The decomposition of equation (5) is 
performed using the two types of weighting schemes defined in the previous paragraph. 
It is important to acknowledge that the lack of longitudinal data prior to 1984 for family 
units selected in ADS 1984 and prior to 1999 for those selected in SFS 1999 limit our ability to 
estimate family units’ permanent income. As pointed out by Altonji et al (2000), much of the 
variation in permanent income may be within the socio-demographic cells included in the 
income regression used to calculate permanent income. Furthermore, our measure of permanent 
income is based solely on family units’ current income (and demographics) and, as such, does 
not capture the number of years members of a family unit have been working full-time in the 
labor market. This means that  if the current income of young families has remained unchanged 
between 1984 and 1999 but if young families’ members have been getting full-time jobs later in 
their life in the 1990s than their counterparts did in the 1980s, the former group will have 
accumulated less money than the latter. Although this may be an important factor behind the 
growth of wealth inequality, it will not be captured in our wealth regressions.
32 
 
VII.2 Estimation Results 
VII.2.1 Using the Natural Logarithm of Wealth as the Dependent Variable  
Table 12 shows the average values of the variables used in the log wealth regressions. Between 
1984 and 1999, average log wealth of family units located in the 15-50
th percentile dropped by -
0.128, while average log wealth of those located in the 50-85
th (60-95
th) percentile increased by 
0.210 (0.264). 
 
For low-wealth family units as well as for both definitions of high-wealth family units, 
permanent income is higher than actual (after-tax) income. As expected, transitory income is, on 
average, very close to zero. 
                                                                                                                                                                                          
decreases a family’s savings rate. Provincial and urban/rural controls are intended to capture differences in 
wealth associated with differences in cost of living. Controls for inheritances (Wi0), inter-vivos transfers (IViT-1) 
and rates of return (riT-1) are not included in the wealth equation since ADS 1984 and SFS 1999 contain no 
information on these variables.    20 
 
Between 1984 and 1999, permanent income has dropped slightly for low-wealth family 
units but has increased for high-wealth family units. Hence, this difference in changes in 
permanent income may potentially explain part of the growth in the wealth gap between high-
wealth family units and low-wealth family units.  
The percentage of young family units—i.e. those whose major income recipient is less 
than 30 years old—has dropped much more among low-wealth family units (from 35% to 21%) 
than among their high-wealth counterparts (from 10% to 5% for family units located in the 50-
85
th percentile, from 8% to 3% for family units located in the 60-95
th percentile). Since the 
average wealth of young family units is below the overall average, these diverging changes in 
the relative importance of young family units may tend to reduce the wealth gap. However, the 
percentage of older family units—i.e. those whose major income recipient is at least 65 years 
old—has risen by at least 5 percentage points among high-wealth family units but has remained 
virtually unchanged among low-wealth family units. This diverging pattern tends to increase the 
wealth gap. As a result, the effect of the changes in the age composition of low-wealth and high-
wealth units on the growth in the wealth gap is unclear. 
Increases in educational attainment are very similar across groups of family units. The 
percentage of major income recipients with a university degree has risen by 6 percentage points 
(from 11% to 17%) among low-wealth family units and by 7 to 9 percentage points among high-
wealth family units. Hence, education is unlikely to be a major factor behind the growth in the 
wealth gap. Similarly, the percentage of lone-parent families has risen very slightly (from 4% to 
5%) among low-wealth family units and has remained virtually unchanged among high-wealth 
family units. As a result, changes in the relative importance of lone-parent families are also 
unlikely to play a substantial role. 
The same conclusion can be reached for family size, province and urban/rural status: 
there are no substantially diverging patterns for these three variables. Hence, our expectations 
are the following: 1) changes in permanent income and in age composition may play a role in 
explaining the growing wealth gap while 2) changes in other demographic characteristics are 
unlikely to do so.   
                                                                                                                                                                                          
32  This potential decrease in the number of years worked full-time could be offset by the fact that the longer time 
spent by youth living at their parents’ home in the 1990s (compared to the 1980s) may allow them to 
accumulate more money than if they had left the “nest” earlier.    21 
 
Table 13 confirms these expectations. Whatever definition of high-wealth family unit is 
considered and whatever weighting scheme is used, education, lone-parent status, family size, 
province and urban-rural status explain virtually none of the growth in the wealth gap.
33 
Differences in the growth of permanent income do play a role but their impact is very limited: 
they only explain between 9% and 15% of the growth in the wealth gap. Unsurprisingly, 
transitory income has no impact. The effect of permanent income is offset by the fact that 
differences in changes in age composition across groups tended to reduce the wealth gap. The 
consequence is that, taken together, all explanatory variables explain virtually none of the 
growth in the wealth gap. 
The conclusion is that neither (differences in) changes in permanent income nor 
(differences in) changes in socio-demographic characteristics, as measured with cross-sectional 
data, explain a significant portion of the growing gap between low-wealth and high-wealth 
family units.
34 Going back to equation (1), this suggests that differences across groups in the 
growth of inheritances, inter vivos transfers, past rates of return and/or in the number of years 
spent working full-time are likely to have contributed to the growth in the wealth gap between 
low-wealth and high-wealth family units.  
 
VII.2.2 Using the Level of Wealth as the Dependent Variable 
Using the natural logarithm of wealth as the dependent variable allows us to compare 
(approximately) the growth rates of wealth experienced by low-wealth and high-wealth families 
between 1984 and 1999. However, the log wealth specification prevents us from including in 
our decomposition family units with zero or negative wealth. To be able to do so, we need to 
specify a wealth equation which uses the level of wealth as the dependent variable. In this case, 
equation (5) measures the change over time in the wealth gap between low-wealth and high-
wealth family units. By wealth gap, we mean the difference between the average wealth of low-
wealth family units and that of high-wealth family units in a given year.  
The problem with this alternative specification is that the wealth gap will always 
increase whenever the average wealth of low-wealth and high-wealth family units grows at 
                                                           
33  Detailed results of log wealth regressions are presented in Appendix 3, Tables 1-6. 
34  This conclusion holds when we use—among other regressors—a quadratic in age of the major income recipient 
(and spouse) in the income regressions and a quadratic in age of the major income recipient in the log wealth 
regressions.    22 
 
exactly the same rate. The increase is then simply due to the fact the level of wealth of low-
wealth family units is lower than that of high-wealth family units. Similarly, whenever the 
average wealth of the former group increases by, for instance, 5% while the average wealth of 
the latter group increases by 10%, part of the increase in the wealth gap will simply be due, not 
to differences in growth rates, but rather simply to the fact the level of wealth of the former 
group is lower than that of the latter group. It is then impossible to interpret equation (5) in a 
meaningful way. Because our primary interest is to explain why the growth rates of average 
wealth have differed between low-wealth and high-wealth family units between 1984 and 1999, 
using the level of wealth as the dependent variable appears, at first, inappropriate for our 
purposes.  
One way to overcome this problem is to recognize that whenever the average wealth of 
one group of family units remains unchanged over time while that of the other group  varies, the 
whole change over time in the wealth gap will be due to differences in growth rates across 
groups of family units. For instance, if the growth rate of average wealth of low-wealth family 
units equals 0% while that of high-wealth family units equals 10%, then the whole increase in 
the wealth gap can be attributed to diverging growth rates. In that case, equation (5) can be 
interpreted in a meaningful way. 
Fortunately, it turns out that the average wealth of the bottom 50% of the wealth 
distribution remained essentially unchanged between 1984 and 1999: it decreased by only -0.6% 
(from $13,808 to $13,722). Meanwhile, the average wealth of family units located between the 
60
th and 95
th percentile rose 32.8% (from $188,469 to $250,223). As a result, 99.9% of the 
increase in the wealth gap between these two groups can be attributed to diverging growth 
rates.
35  For this reason, we recalculate equation (5) using the level of wealth as the dependent 
variable in the wealth regression. The results are presented in Table 14.
36 
Our main conclusion—that neither (differences in) changes in permanent income nor 
(differences in) changes in socio-demographic characteristics explain a significant portion of the 
                                                           
35  The wealth gap increased by $61,840 [i.e. ($250,223 - $13,722) – ($188,469 - $13,808)]. Had the average 
wealth of family units located in the bottom 50% of the wealth distribution remained unchanged, the wealth gap 
would have risen by $61,754 [i.e. ($250,223 -  $188,469)], i.e. 99.9% of the observed increase in the wealth 
gap. 
36  Detailed results of  (level of) wealth regressions are presented in Appendix 3, Tables 7-10. 
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growing gap between low-wealth and high-wealth family units—remains unchanged. Taken 
together, income and demographic factors explain at most 8% of the increase in the wealth gap. 
VIII. AN ACCOUNTING EXPLANATION FOR THE GROWTH OF WEALTH 
INEQUALITY 
 
In any given year t, the Gini coefficient of wealth (Gt) is the sum of the contributions of each 
wealth component k to overall inequality (Ckt): 
 
(6) Gt = Σ Ckt  
 
In the case of the Gini coefficient, the contribution of each wealth component k to overall 
inequality equals (Lerman and Yitzhaki, 1985): 
 
(7) Ckt = Gkt * Skt * Rkt 
 
where Gkt is the Gini coefficient of wealth component k in year t, Skt is the share of component 
k in total net worth and Rkt is the “Gini correlation” between the component k and the overall 
net worth.
37 Equation (7) implies that the contribution of wealth component k to overall wealth 
inequality is higher, the more unequally this wealth component is distributed (i.e. the higher Gkt 
is), the greater the relative importance of this wealth component in overall net worth is (i.e. the 
greater Skt is) and the greater the correlation between this component and overall net worth is 
(i.e. the greater Rkt is). For instance, since the share of housing (vehicles) in overall net worth is 
high (low), we expect—other things being equal—housing (vehicles) to have a relatively large 
(small) contribution to overall inequality in a given year. 
   Combining equations (6) and (7), the change in the Gini coefficient between 1984 and 
1999 can be expressed as the sum of the changes in the contribution of each component: 
 
(8) G99 – G84 = (Σ Gk99 * Sk99 * Rk99) -  (Σ Gk84 * Sk84 * Rk84) 
                                                           
37  Rkt equals the ratio of the covariance of wealth component k with cumulative distribution of overall net worth to 
the covariance of wealth component k with the cumulative distribution of component k. It equals 1 whenever 
the ranking of family units on the particular component is identical to the ranking of family units on overall net 
worth (see Pedersen, 1999:220, quoted by Myles, 2000). 
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It is important to understand that the decomposition of the change in the Gini coefficient 
performed in equation (8) is a purely accounting exercise. For instance, equation (8) may reveal 
that part of the growth in inequality observed between 1984 and 1999 is accounted for by an 
increase in the contribution Ckt of stocks to overall inequality. If this increase in the contribution 
of stocks is, for instance,  due to an increase in the relative importance of stocks in overall net 
worth (Skt) or to an increase in inequality in the stocks distribution (Gkt), equation (8) does not 
tell us why the relative importance of stocks has increased nor why the distribution of stocks has 
become more unequal. Furthermore, the relative importance of a given wealth component at 
time T does not explain net worth at time T.
38 
In Table 15, we use the sample consisting of all family units and look at the contribution 
Ckt of each wealth component to overall inequality in a given year.
39  Information on Gkt, Skt, 
and Rkt is also presented. Three points are worth noting regarding these last three variables. 
First, of all wealth components representing at least 5% of net worth, principal residence 
and vehicles are the two most equally distributed wealth components, exhibiting a Gini 
coefficient ranging between 0.605 and 0.635, depending on the year considered (Table 15, 
column 2). In contrast, 1) stocks, bonds and mutual funds, 2) real estate other than principal 
residence, and 3) business equity, are the three most unequally distributed wealth components, 
with Gini coefficients ranging between 0.916 and 0.985. Second, principal residence is by far 
the most important wealth component, accounting for 49%-51% of net worth (Table 15, column 
3). Third, the “Gini correlation” is the highest for business equity (between 0.928 and 0.933), 
indicating that the ranking of family units by business equity is very close to the ranking of 
family units by net worth (Table 15, column 4). Conversely, among all assets, the  “Gini 
correlation” is the lowest for vehicles: it ranges between 0.525 and 0.590. This means that the  
ranking of family units by value of vehicles convey less information about the ranking of family 
 
                                                           
38  For any given family unit, the relative importance of a given wealth component in overall net worth at time T 
results from a portfolio decision regarding the allocation of net worth at time T but does not explain net worth 
at time T. Net worth at time T depends—among other factors—on rates of return received in the past, which in 
turn are likely to depend on the allocation of net worth between high-risk and low-risk assets which was done in 
the past. Net worth at time T does not depend on the allocation of net worth at time T. 
39  See Appendix 4 for the results regarding the two other samples excluding the top 1% and the top 5% percent of 
family units, respectively.  
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units by net worth, compared to business equity.
40 
Dramatic shifts in the relative importance of wealth components took place between 
1984 and 1999. The share of registered retirement savings plans (RRSPs) in wealth increased 
from 4% to 16%, reflecting the growing popularity of this financial asset in family units’ 
portfolio.
41 Similarly, the share of stocks, bonds and mutual funds rose from 6% to 11%. The 
share of mortgage on principal residence rose from 10% to 14%, probably due in part to the 
easier access to mortgage loans provided by financial institutions between 1984 and 1999.
42 
These changes were accompanied by a marked decrease in the relative importance of business 
equity (from 25% to 17%) and a more moderate decrease in the relative importance of deposits 
(from 11% to 8%).
43   
In a given year, which wealth components contribute the most to wealth inequality? 
Both in 1984 and 1999, principal residence has by far the biggest contribution to overall 
inequality. It accounts for 34%-36% of overall inequality (Table 15, column 6). While the 
contribution of principal residence remained stable between 1984 and 1999, this was not the 
case for other wealth components. The contribution of RRSPs to overall inequality rose from 
4% to 15%. The contribution of stocks, bonds and mutual funds increased from 6% to 13%. In 
contrast, the contribution of business equity dropped dramatically, showing a decline from 32% 
to 21%. The contribution of deposits also fell (from 10% to 6%).
44 
While the growing contribution of RRSPS, stocks, bonds and mutual funds to overall 
inequality comes as no surprise, the markedly decreasing contribution of business equity is, at 
first, puzzling.  
                                                           
40  Almost all of these qualitative conclusions hold for the two other samples. The only exception is that the “Gini 
correlation” for business equity, while among the highest across wealth components, is not always the highest 
in the two other samples, especially in the sample excluding the top 5% of family units.  
41  The Income Tax Act raised the dollar limit on contributions to RRSPs from $5,500 in 1984 to $13,500 in 1999 
(for individuals without a registered pension plan). This is likely to have contributed to the growing popularity 
of RRSPs. The growing importance of self-employed individuals, who rely on RRSPs and other financial assets 
to build retirement savings, may also have contributed to the growing popularity of RRSPs. 
42  This easier access to mortgage loans is also consistent with the fact that inequality in mortgage on principal 
residence decreased from 0.833 to 0.794 during the period. 
43  These qualitative conclusions hold when we exclude the top 1% of family units. However, when we exclude the 
top 5% of family units, the relative importance of stocks, bonds and mutual funds rises only marginally and the 
relative importance of deposits falls more than the relative importance of business equity. 
44  These qualitative conclusions hold when we exclude the top 1% of family units. However, when we exclude the 
top 5% of family units, the contribution of stocks, bonds and mutual funds rises only marginally.    26 
 
The puzzle can be resolved. First, note that the decline in the contribution of business 
equity to overall inequality is, in an accounting sense, entirely explained by the decrease in the 
relative importance of business equity in net worth (from 25% to 17%).
45 Second, note that the 
bulk of the decrease in the relative importance of business equity in net worth is explained by 
the fact that the average business equity for family units who have a business dropped from 
$224,000 in 1984 to $156,000 in 1999 (1999 constant dollars).
46  
Third, shift-share analysis shows that this decrease in the average business equity of 
family units with a business is entirely explained by the fact that the distribution of businesses 
moved towards very small firms. More precisely, the percentage of businesses with net equity 
ranging between $0 and $10,000 rose from 20% in 1984 to 49% in 1999 while the relative 
importance of businesses with net equity of $100,000-$500,000 dropped from 29% to 17% 
(Table 16). This increase in self-employment in very small businesses occurred in a period 
where self-employment without paid help grew tremendously.
47 This suggests that the move 
towards self-employed jobs without paid help and with very small assets (e.g. self-employed 
persons operating a consulting business with a microcomputer and some other electronic 
equipment at home) is at the heart of the decrease in the relative importance of business equity 
and thus, is an important factor behind the decrease in the contribution of business equity to 
overall inequality. 
Since the contribution of RRSPs and stocks, bonds and mutual funds to overall 
inequality has increased between 1984 and 1999, while the contribution of business equity and 
                                                                                                                                                                                          
 
45  The Gini coefficient for business equity rose slightly between 1984 and 1999 (from 0.963 to 0.985) while the 
“Gini correlation” for business equity remained virtually unchanged (0.933 in 1984 and 0.928 in 1999). 
46  Between 1984 and 1999, average wealth rose from $128,875 to $176,087. Average business equity for all 
family units dropped from $31,743 to $29,028. This decrease occurred despite the fact that the proportion of 
family units with a business rose from 14.2% to 18.7% during the period. Hence, all the drop in average 
business equity is due to the fact that average business equity for family units with a business dropped from 
$224,086 to $155,610. Had average business equity for family units with a business remained unchanged at 
$224,086, average business equity for all family units would have been equal to $41,904 (i.e. $224,086 times 
18.7%) and would have represented 24% (i.e. $41,904 / $176,087) of net worth. Under these conditions, the 
relative importance of business equity in net worth would have dropped only from 25% to 24%, rather than 
from 25% to 17%. Hence, the bulk of the decrease in the relative importance of business equity in net worth is 
explained by the fact that the average business equity for family units with a business dropped from $224,086 in 
1984 to $155,610 in 1999.     
47  ADS 1984 and SFS 1999 indicate that, between 1984 and 1999, the number of family units having a business 
with a net equity of $0-$10,000 rose by roughly 850,000. This is consistent with the fact that, during the same 
period, the number of self-employed individuals without paid help grew by roughly 760,000 [Labor Force 
Historical Review 1999, CD-Rom 71F0004XCB].     27 
 
deposits has fallen, we expect these four wealth components to be the major factors accounting 
for the growth in wealth inequality during the period. 
Using equation (8), we confirm this conjecture. Between 1984 and 1999, the Gini 
coefficient of wealth increased by 0.036 (Table 17, column 1).   The two most important 
contributors to the growth of wealth inequality were RRSPs (0.079) and stocks, bonds and 
mutual funds (0.049), which tended to increase the Gini by 0.128 (0.079 + 0.049). The effect of 
these two factors was partially offset by business equity and deposits: business equity tended to 
reduce the Gini by 0.071 while deposits tended to reduce the Gini by 0.019. Principal residence 
explained virtually none of the growth in wealth inequality. 
Thus, when we consider all family units, the growth of wealth inequality can be 
explained, in an accounting sense, mainly by the growing contribution of RRSPs and stocks, 
bonds and mutual funds to overall inequality, which is partially offset by the declining 
contribution of business equity and deposits.
48 
This qualitative conclusion holds when we exclude the top 1% of family units (Table 17, 
column 2).
49 However, it must be altered when we exclude the top 5% of family units. In this 
case, RRSPs remain the most important contributor to the growth of wealth inequality but 
stocks, bonds and mutual funds no longer have a major impact.
50 Business equity and deposits 
remain the two most important factors tending to decrease wealth inequality. 
                                                                                                                                                                                          
 
48  In the late 1980s, pension legislation was revised to allow people leaving their employer pension plan to remove 
the money from the plan and put it in a locked-in RRSP (called a locked-in retirement account or LIRA). In 
1984, this money would more likely have been left in the plan. Since we do not have estimates of employer 
pension plan assets for 1984, we would ideally like to exclude LIRAs from our concept of wealth when using 
1999 data. Unfortunately, data editing suggested that many respondents did not have a clear idea of the 
distinction between  LIRAs and RRSPs in 1999. Accordingly, it was decided to include LIRAs with RRSPs in 
the SFS data set. To check whether the finding that RRSPs have, of all wealth components, contributed the 
most to the increase in wealth inequality, is robust, we also calculated imputed values for LIRAs and excluded 
these values from the concept of wealth in 1999. In this case, the Gini coefficient of wealth increased by 0.037.  
The two most important contributors to the growth of wealth inequality were still RRSPs (0.072) and stocks, 
bonds and mutual funds (0.051), which tended to increase the Gini by 0.123 (0.072 + 0.051). Once again, the 
effect of these two factors was partially offset by business equity and deposits: business equity tended to reduce 
the Gini by 0.069 while deposits tended to reduce the Gini by 0.019. Principal residence explained virtually 
none of the growth in wealth inequality. Thus, excluding LIRAs from the 1999 data does not affect our 
conclusion regarding the importance of RRSPs. 
49  Between 1984 and 1999, the Gini coefficient of wealth increased by 0.029 for this sample. RRSPs and stocks, 
bonds and mutual funds tended to increase the Gini by 0.084 and 0.024, respectively. Business equity tended to 
reduce the Gini  by 0.060 while deposits tended to reduce the Gini by 0.015. Principal residence had some 
effect (0.011) but this was mainly offset by the equalizing impact of mortgage on principal residence (-0.008). 
50  Principal residence was the second most important contributor to the growth of wealth inequality but its impact 
was partially offset by the equalizing effect of mortgage on principal residence.     28 
 
 IX.  SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
This paper has documented the evolution of wealth inequality in Canada between 1984 and 
1999. The main findings can be summarized as follows: 
 
1.  wealth inequality has increased between 1984 and 1999; 
2.  the growth in wealth inequality has been associated with substantial declines in real average 
and median wealth for some groups, such as young couples with children and recent 
immigrants; 
3.  only the 10
th (and for some samples, the 9
th) decile has increased its share of total net worth 
between 1984 and 1999; 
4.  wealth inequality increased more among non-elderly couples with  children and  among 
lone-parent families than among unattached individuals and non-elderly couples with no 
children; 
5.  real median wealth and real average wealth rose much more among family units whose 
major income recipient is a university graduate than among other family units; they both fell 
among family units whose major income recipient is aged 25-34 and increased among those 
whose major income recipient is aged 55 and over;  
6.  the aging of the Canadian population over the 1984-1999 period has tended to increase 
average wealth and to reduce wealth inequality; 
7. when all family units are considered, changes in family structure—i.e. the growing 
proportion of lone-parent families and unattached individuals—have an ambiguous  impact 
on wealth inequality. However, when the top 1% of family units are excluded, changes in 
family structure account for 14%-22% of the growth in wealth inequality; 
8.  changes in relative average wealth by age and education level of the major income recipient 
have an ambiguous effect on wealth inequality; 
9.  depending on whether wealth is specified in logarithms or levels, regression-based methods 
suggest that changes in families’ permanent after-tax income account for 3%-15% of the 
growth in the wealth gap between low-wealth and high-wealth family units; 
10. in a purely accounting (and not causal) sense, registered retirement savings plans (RRSPs) 
have, of all wealth components, contributed the most to the increase in wealth inequality.    29 
 
Several factors may have contributed to the growth of wealth inequality. First, the 
increase in the length of time young individuals stay in school before entering the labor market 
in a full-time job (decreasing the number of years over which they have had significant 
incomes) and the greater debt load of students (Finnie, 2001) probably account for part of the 
decrease in their real median wealth.
51 Second, the booming stock market of the 1990s has 
likely contributed to the rapid revaluation of financial assets observed in Canada over the last 
decade (Yan, 2001). Since financial assets are held predominantly by families at the top of the 
wealth distribution, this revaluation is likely to have contributed to the growth of wealth 
inequality.
52 Third, easier access to credit and/or changes in preferences may have induced some 
low-wealth families to accumulate more debt in order to finance consumption expenditures, 
thereby decreasing their net worth. Fourth, increases in contributions to RRSPs made by 
families in the middle of the wealth distribution could have widened the gap between them and 
poorer families if these greater contributions induced an increase in their savings rate. Fifth, 
differences—between low-wealth and high-wealth family units—in the growth of inheritances 
and inter vivos transfers may also have played a role. These factors cannot be quantified with 
existing data sets. 
The growing proportion of young couples with children who have zero or negative wealth 
suggests that a non-negligible fraction of today’s young families may be vulnerable to negative 
shocks, i.e. have no accumulated savings that can provide liquidity in periods of economic 
stress. Whether the picture one gets of vulnerable families changes when considering wealth 
instead of income is a question which deserves further research.   
                                                           
51   The fact that young individuals get married later—thereby benefiting later from the economies of scale 
associated with cohabitation—could also be a factor. However, it might be offset by the fact that some young 
individuals stay with their parents for a longer period and/or use other forms of cohabitation. Similarly, the 
downward shift in the age-earnings profile of young men, documented by Beaudry and Green (1996), may have 
tended to reduce real wealth of young males but its impact may have been partly offset by the growing number 
of dual-earner couples among young families. 
52  This is what we mean when we argue that differences—between low-wealth and high-wealth family units—in 
the growth of rates of return on savings are likely to have played a role in the growth of wealth inequality.     30 
 
Table 1 : Average and median wealth, by family unit, 1984 and 1999.
_______________________________________________________________________________________________________
      1999 constant dollars
________________________
1984 1999 % change
1984-1999
I. All family units
A) Net worth
Median 58,392 64,600 10.6%
Average 128,875 176,087 36.6%
Percent with zero or negative net worth 10.8% 13.3% 23.1%
B) Financial wealth
Median 10,897 14,850 36.3%
Average 34,563 66,514 92.4%
Percent with zero or negative financial wealth 17.7% 19.7% 11.3%
Sample size 14,029 15,933 -
II. Top 1% of family units excluded *
A) Net worth
Median 56,982 63,066 10.7%
Average 107,918 140,864 30.5%
Percent with zero or negative net worth 10.9% 13.4% 22.9%
B) Financial wealth
Median 10,728 14,310 33.4%
Average 31,371 54,274 73.0%
Percent with zero or negative financial wealth 17.8% 19.9% 11.8%
Sample size 13,870 15,452 -
III. Top 5% of family units excluded *
A) Net worth
Median 51,483 56,600 9.9%
Average 84,315 108,116 28.2%
Percent with zero or negative net worth 11.3% 14.0% 23.9%
B) Financial wealth
Median 9,962 12,650 27.0%
Average 25,423 38,783 52.6%
Percent with zero or negative financial wealth 18.2% 20.7% 13.7%
Sample size 13,282 14,474 -
_______________________________________________________________________________________________________
Source : Assets and Debts Survey of 1984, Survey of Financial Security of 1999.
* After ranking family units by ascending order of their net worth.
- Financial wealth equals net worth minus net equity in housing and net business equity.   31 
 
Table 2 : Average wealth by age of major income recipient, 1984 and 1999.
__________________________________________________________________________________________________
Average wealth Distribution of family units
(1999 constant $) by age of major income recipient
________________________ ________________________
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1984 1999 % change 1984 1999  change
1984-99 % % 1984-99
I. All family units
Age of major income recipient
Less than 25 32,284 32,918 2.0% 10.2 5.9 -4.2
25-34 69,890 67,264 -3.8% 26.0 19.5 -6.5
35-44 137,608 151,915 10.4% 20.2 24.7 4.5
45-54 202,422 247,751 22.4% 14.7 19.6 4.9
55-64 210,290 302,856 44.0% 13.1 11.9 -1.2
65 and over 140,749 211,862 50.5% 15.9 18.3 2.4
Average wealth - total 128,875 176,087 36.6% 100.0 100.0 -
% of growth in average wealth (36.6% = 100)
accounted for by demographic weights
1984 weights 31.4
1999 weights 29.9
II. Top 1% of family units excluded
Age of major income recipient
Less than 25 31,722 24,599 -22.5% 10.3 6.0 -4.3
25-34 61,864 58,476 -5.5% 26.2 19.7 -6.5
35-44 113,998 118,501 3.9% 20.1 24.8 4.6
45-54 158,823 190,114 19.7% 14.5 19.5 4.9
55-64 176,397 234,190 32.8% 13.0 11.8 -1.2
65 and over 122,615 185,074 50.9% 15.9 18.3 2.4
Average wealth - total 107,918 140,864 30.5% 100.0 100.0 -
% of growth in average wealth (30.5% = 100)
accounted for by demographic weights
1984 weights 35.4
1999 weights 31.5
III. Top 5% of family units excluded
Age of major income recipient
Less than 25 24,123 16,461 -31.8% 10.6 6.2 -4.4
25-34 51,388 49,404 -3.9% 26.8 20.3 -6.5
35-44 93,122 97,697 4.9% 20.3 25.2 4.9
45-54 125,117 141,893 13.4% 14.2 18.9 4.8
55-64 129,691 167,891 29.5% 12.3 11.3 -1.1
65 and over 97,023 147,156 51.7% 15.8 18.1 2.3
Average wealth - total 84,315 108,117 28.2% 100.0 100.0 -
% of growth in average wealth (28.2% = 100)




Source : Assets and Debts Survey of 1984, Survey of Financial Security of 1999.
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Table 3 : Changes in wealth inequality, 1984-1999.
____________________________________________________________________________________________________
1984 1999 Change
I. All family units 1984-1999
%
A) Unit of analysis : family unit
Gini 0.691 0.727 5.2
CV 2.325 3.146 35.3
Exponential 0.531 0.560 5.5
B) Unit of analysis : individuals
Gini 0.678 0.723 6.6
CV 2.390 3.105 29.9
Exponential 0.501 0.541 8.0
II. Top 1% of family units excluded *
A) Unit of analysis : family unit
Gini 0.646 0.675 4.4
CV 1.429 1.517 6.2
Exponential 0.542 0.556 2.6
B) Unit of analysis : individuals
Gini 0.635 0.674 6.2
CV 1.517 1.639 8.0
Exponential 0.468 0.493 5.5
III. Top 5% of family units excluded *
A) Unit of analysis : family unit
Gini 0.605 0.637 5.4
CV 1.169 1.255 7.4
Exponential 0.906 0.838 -7.4
B) Unit of analysis : individuals
Gini 0.597 0.642 7.5
CV 1.266 1.397 10.3
Exponential 0.492 0.472 -3.9
____________________________________________________________________________________________________
Source : Assets and Debts Survey of 1984, Survey of Financial Security of 1999.
* After ranking family units by ascending order of their net worth.   33 
 
Table 4: Changes in median net worth from 1984 to 1999, by net worth decile.
__________________________________________________________________________________________________
    Median net worth  Change from 1984 to 1999
(1999 constant dollars)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
1984 1999 (2) - (1) %
I. All family units
Decile
1st -1,824 -5,700 -3,876 -
2nd 674 101 -573 -85.0
3rd 6,743 5,920 -823 -12.2
4th 21,380 22,700 1,320 6.2
5th 45,365 49,580 4,215 9.3
6th 72,155 81,466 9,311 12.9
7th 104,764 129,000 24,237 23.1
8th 147,751 192,500 44,749 30.3
9th 222,861 299,373 76,512 34.3
10th 464,376 628,100 163,724 35.3
II. Top 1% of  family units excluded *
Decile
1st -1,839 -5,900 -4,061 -
2nd 615 100 -515 -83.7
3rd 6,448 5,550 -898 -13.9
4th 20,684 22,000 1,316 6.4
5th 44,139 47,929 3,790 8.6
6th 70,861 79,301 8,440 11.9
7th 102,331 125,400 23,069 22.5
8th 143,298 186,025 42,728 29.8
9th 213,797 283,545 69,748 32.6
10th 407,976 559,350 151,374 37.1
III. Top 5% of  family units excluded *
Decile
1st -1,992 -6,220 -4,228 -
2nd 463 50 -413 -89.2
3rd 5,574 4,500 -1,074 -19.3
4th 17,864 19,060 1,196 6.7
5th 39,388 42,597 3,209 8.1
6th 65,288 72,200 6,912 10.6
7th 93,028 112,600 19,572 21.0
8th 130,031 165,600 35,569 27.4
9th 183,957 242,455 58,498 31.8
10th 296,079 410,500 114,421 38.6
__________________________________________________________________________________________________
Source : Assets and Debts Survey of 1984, Survey of Financial Security of 1999.
* After ranking family units by ascending order of their net worth.
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Table 5: Shares of total net worth held by each decile, 1984 and 1999.
________________________________________________________________________________________________________
(1) (2) (3)
1984 1999 (2) - (1)
I. All family units %%
Decile
1st -0.5 -0.6 -0.1
2nd 0.1 0.0 -0.1
3rd 0.5 0.4 -0.2
4th 1.7 1.3 -0.4
5th 3.5 2.8 -0.7
6th 5.6 4.7 -1.0
7th 8.2 7.4 -0.8
8th 11.5 11.0 -0.6
9th 17.5 17.4 -0.2
10th 51.8 55.7 3.9
II. Top 1% of family units excluded *
Decile
1st -0.6 -0.8 -0.2
2nd 0.1 0.0 -0.1
3rd 0.6 0.4 -0.2
4th 1.9 1.6 -0.4
5th 4.1 3.4 -0.7
6th 6.6 5.7 -0.9
7th 9.5 9.0 -0.5
8th 13.4 13.3 -0.1
9th 20.1 20.7 0.6
10th 44.2 46.6 2.4
III. Top 5% of family units excluded *
Decile
1st -0.7 -1.0 -0.3
2nd 0.1 0.0 -0.1
3rd 0.7 0.5 -0.2
4th 2.2 1.8 -0.4
5th 4.7 4.0 -0.7
6th 7.7 6.7 -1.0
7th 11.1 10.4 -0.7
8th 15.5 15.4 -0.1
9th 22.0 22.8 0.8
10th 36.8 39.5 2.6
________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Source : Assets and Debts Survey of 1984, Survey of Financial Security of 1999.
* After ranking family units by ascending order of their net worth.
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Table 6: Gini coefficient by family type, 1984 and 1999.
_________________________________________________________________________________________________
1984 1999 % change
I. All family units
Unattached individuals - elderly 0.647 0.655 1.2%
Unattached individuals -  non elderly 0.853 0.868 1.8%
Non-elderly couples with no children or other relatives 0.666 0.695 4.4%
Non-elderly couples with children under 18 ** 0.647 0.707 9.3%
Non-elderly couples with children 18 and over or other relatives *** 0.540 0.614 13.7%
Elderly couples with no children or other relatives 0.540 0.541 0.2%
Lone-parent families 0.807 0.897 11.2%
Other family types 0.667 0.650 -2.5%
II. Top 1% of family units excluded *
Unattached individuals - elderly 0.626 0.633 1.1%
Unattached individuals -  non elderly 0.840 0.852 1.4%
Non-elderly couples with no children or other relatives 0.612 0.618 1.0%
Non-elderly couples with children under 18 ** 0.587 0.636 8.3%
Non-elderly couples with children 18 and over or other relatives *** 0.460 0.530 15.2%
Elderly couples with no children or other relatives 0.490 0.486 -0.8%
Lone-parent families 0.807 0.866 7.3%
Other family types 0.612 0.603 -1.5%
III. Top 5% of family units excluded *
Unattached individuals - elderly 0.598 0.599 0.2%
Unattached individuals -  non elderly 0.823 0.840 2.1%
Non-elderly couples with no children or other relatives 0.568 0.569 0.2%
Non-elderly couples with children under 18 ** 0.535 0.591 10.5%
Non-elderly couples with children 18 and over or other relatives *** 0.385 0.461 19.7%
Elderly couples with no children or other relatives 0.416 0.416 0.0%
Lone-parent families 0.801 0.864 7.9%
Other family types 0.560 0.553 -1.3%
_________________________________________________________________________________________________
Source : Assets and Debts Survey of 1984, Survey of Financial Security of 1999.
* After ranking family units by ascending order of their net worth.
** : The family includes at least one child of the major income earner under 18. Other relatives may also be in the family.
*** :  Includes no children under 18.   36 
 
Table 7: Changes in average net worth of non-elderly couples with children under 18, by quintile.*
__________________________________________________________________________________________________
Average net worth Change from 1984 to 1999
(1999 constant dollars)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
1984 1999 (2) - (1) %
I. All non-elderly couples with children under 18
Quintile
1st 65 -3,275 -3,340 -
2nd 34,849 29,819 -5,030 -14.4
3rd 77,853 80,498 2,645 3.4
4th 140,961 170,174 29,213 20.7
5th 493,015 703,527 210,512 42.7
II. Top 1% of  non-elderly couples with children under 18 excluded **
Quintile
1st -83 -3,392 -3,309 -
2nd 34,289 29,192 -5,097 -14.9
3rd 76,645 78,806 2,161 2.8
4th 137,703 165,624 27,921 20.3
5th 383,161 494,398 111,237 29.0
III. Top 5% of  non-elderly couples with children under 18 excluded **
Quintile
1st -708 -4,013 -3,305 -
2nd 31,954 26,815 -5,139 -16.1
3rd 71,845 72,356 511 0.7
4th 126,223 149,044 22,821 18.1
5th 269,504 349,289 79,785 29.6
__________________________________________________________________________________________________
Source : Assets and Debts Survey of 1984, Survey of Financial Security of 1999.
* couples with at least one child of the major income earner under age 18.
** After ranking couples with children by ascending order of their net worth.   37 
 
Table 8: Median and average wealth by characteristics of the major income recipient, 1984-1999 - All family units.*
__________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Median wealth Average wealth
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1984 1999 % Change 1984 1999 % Change
$ $ 1984-99 $ $ 1984-99
Education level of major income recipient
Not a university graduate 52,807 54,100 2.4 119,344 145,279 21.7
University graduate 99,637 118,000 18.4 189,295 289,522 52.9
 
Age of major income recipient  
24 or younger 3,073 150 -95.1 32,285 32,918 2.0
25-34 23,395 15,100 -35.5 69,890 67,264 -3.8
35-44 73,488 60,000 -18.4 137,608 151,915 10.4
45-54 123,987 115,200 -7.1 202,422 247,751 22.4
55-64 129,090 154,115 19.4 210,290 303,856 44.5
65 or older 80,789 126,000 56.0 140,749 211,863 50.5
 
Education / Age of major income recipient
25-34 - Not a university graduate 21,196 11,100 -47.6 62,564 49,836 -20.3
25-34 - University graduate 41,224 30,900 -25.0 102,119 112,088 9.8
35-54 - Not a university graduate 80,461 65,800 -18.2 153,211 156,045 1.8
35-54 - University graduate 130,271 144,741 11.1 218,715 312,320 42.8
Immigration Status of Major Income Recipient  
Canadian born 53,947 60,500 12.1 122,866 168,695 37.3
Immigrant:  in Canada 20 years or more 120,002 171,300 42.7 194,756 285,585 46.6
Immigrant:  in Canada 10-19 years 68,047 44,500 -34.6 114,357 140,782 23.1
Immigrant:  in Canada less than 10 years 17,625 13,100 -25.7 90,103 75,686 -16.0
Family type
Unattached individuals - elderly 41,380 70,000 69.2 78,674 138,107 75.5
Unattached individuals -  non elderly 5,772 6,000 4.0 47,204 63,888 35.3
Couples, no children (a) 71,526 101,603 42.1 151,171 244,174 61.5
Couples, children under 18 (b) 77,703 77,800 0.1 144,151 195,922 35.9
Couples, children 18 and over ( c ) 155,788 167,400 7.5 252,529 312,493 23.7
Elderly couples, no children (d) 121,075 177,500 46.6 198,498 280,487 41.3
Lone-parent families 1,870 3,656 95.5 38,534 63,808 65.6
Other family types 75,856 112,700 48.6 147,715 210,155 42.3
__________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Source : Assets and Debts Survey of 1984 and Survey of Financial Security of 1999.
* The numbers are expressed in 1999 constant dollars.
(a): Non-elderly couples with no children or other relatives
(b): Non-elderly couples with children under 18 
(c):Non-elderly couples with children 18 and over or other relatives 
(d) : Elderly couples with no children or other relatives   38 
 
Table  9: Changes in average and median  net worth of non-elderly couples with children under 18,







Age of major income recipient
I. 25-54
Average 149,674 194,949 30.2%
Median 78,622 78,500 -0.2%
% of couples with zero or negative net worth 6.2 8.5
II. 25-34
Average 94,915 76,408 -19.5%
Median 43,990 30,841 -29.9%
% of couples with zero or negative net worth 9.5 16.0
III. 35-44
Average 163,372 197,931 21.2%
Median 91,123 89,500 -1.8%
% of couples with zero or negative net worth 4.9 6.8
IV. 45-54
Average 227,809 326,831 43.5%
Median 144,370 161,500 11.9%
% of couples with zero or negative net worth 2.8 3.4
__________________________________________________________________________________________________
Source : Assets and Debts Survey of 1984, Survey of Financial Security of 1999.
* non-elderly couples with at least one child of the major income recipient age 18.   39 
 
Table 10: Counterfactual levels of wealth inequality in 1999 (based on 1984 weights).*
____________________________________________________________________________________________________
Actual data 1999 based on 
________________________ ________________________
(1) (2) (3) (4)
1984 1984
1984 1999 family type age
structure structure
I. All family units
Gini 0.691 0.727 0.724 0.750
CV 2.325 3.146 3.157 3.261
Exponential 0.531 0.560 0.558 0.590
II. Top 1% of family units excluded *
Gini 0.646 0.675 0.669 0.702
CV 1.429 1.517 1.498 1.613
Exponential 0.542 0.556 0.554 0.612
III. Top 5% of family units excluded *
Gini 0.605 0.637 0.629 0.668
CV 1.169 1.255 1.235 1.341
Exponential 0.906 0.838 0.848 1.074
____________________________________________________________________________________________________
Source : Assets and Debts Survey of 1984 and Survey of Financial Security of 1999.
* Family units are the unit of analysis.
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Table 11  : Counterfactual  levels of wealth inequality in 1999.*
____________________________________________________________________________________________________
Actual data 1999 based on 
________________________ ________________________________________
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
1984 1984 1984
1984 1999 relative wealth relative wealth family
by age  by age  characteristics
and education level
I. All family units
Gini 0.691 0.727 0.725 0.721 0.740
CV 2.325 3.146 3.207 3.161 3.244
Exponential 0.531 0.560 0.572 0.580 0.603
II. Top 1% of family units excluded *
Gini 0.646 0.675 0.672 0.671 0.695
CV 1.429 1.517 1.519 1.507 1.597
Exponential 0.542 0.556 0.643 0.656 0.676
III. Top 5% of family units excluded *
Gini 0.605 0.637 0.637 0.636 0.661
CV 1.169 1.255 1.260 1.257 1.326
Exponential 0.906 0.838 1.222 1.174 1.312
____________________________________________________________________________________________________
Source : Assets and Debts Survey of 1984 and Survey of Financial Security of 1999.
* Family units are the unit of analysis.   41 
 
Table 12: Descriptive statistics - variables included in the log wealth regressions, 1984 and 1999.
________________________________________________________________________________________________________
I. Explanatory variables 15-50th percentile 50-85th percentile 60-95th percentile
in the wealth regression 1984 1999 1984 1999 1984 1999
Actual income * 30.394 31.509 43.929 46.289 49.326 50.815
Permanent income ($000) 35.847 34.744 50.908 54.408 56.290 58.902
Transitory income ($000) 7.48E-08 -1.57E-08 2.31E-07 2.08E-07 4.86E-08 -1.72E-07
Fraction of family units whose
major income recipient is aged:
Less than 30 0.348 0.211 0.097 0.046 0.077 0.030
30-44 0.338 0.407 0.353 0.340 0.323 0.294
45-54 0.091 0.156 0.185 0.233 0.215 0.246
55-64 0.076 0.079 0.171 0.137 0.195 0.170
65 an over 0.148 0.147 0.195 0.245 0.191 0.260
Fraction of family units whose
major income recipient is :
Not a university graduate 0.889 0.826 0.857 0.781 0.833 0.744
A university graduate 0.111 0.174 0.143 0.219 0.167 0.256
Fraction of family units who are:
Not lone-parent families  0.964 0.948 0.981 0.982 0.983 0.987
Lone-parent families 0.036 0.052 0.019 0.018 0.017 0.013
Family size 2.384 2.254 2.922 2.655 2.997 2.701
Fraction of family units living in:
Newfoundland 0.022 0.021 0.021 0.015 0.015 0.009
Prince-Edward-Island 0.004 0.005 0.005 0.004 0.004 0.004
Nova Scotia 0.034 0.034 0.036 0.032 0.029 0.026
New Brunswick 0.033 0.029 0.025 0.026 0.019 0.018
Quebec 0.294 0.294 0.252 0.245 0.216 0.212
Ontario 0.319 0.330 0.380 0.375 0.403 0.409
Manitoba 0.039 0.040 0.044 0.039 0.045 0.035
Saskatchewan 0.036 0.031 0.037 0.036 0.041 0.035
Alberta 0.104 0.089 0.077 0.102 0.083 0.104
British Columbia 0.115 0.127 0.122 0.125 0.145 0.147
Fraction of family units living in:
rural areas 0.145 0.156 0.177 0.195 0.166 0.180
urban areas 0.855 0.844 0.823 0.805 0.834 0.820
II. Wealth
Average wealth (1999 constant $) 21,386 22,652 121,670 153,684 188,469 250,223
Average log wealth 9.453 9.325 11.643 11.853 12.050 12.314
Sample size 4,863 5,252 5,049 5,499 4,974 5,509 ________________________________________________________________________________________________________
* not an explanatory variable in the wealth regression. See text for  the definition of permanent and transitory income.
Source: Assets and Debts Survey of 1984, Survey of Financial Security of 1999.   42 
 
Table 13: Decomposition of the difference between the change over time in average log wealth of low-wealth family
units and that of low-wealth family units.
________________________________________________________________________________________________________
I. Average log wealth
1984 1999 Change
1984-99
15-50th percentile 9.453 9.325 -0.128
50-85th percentile 11.643 11.853 0.210
Difference in changes over time - - 0.338
15-50th percentile 9.453 9.325 -0.128
60-95th percentile 12.050 12.314 0.264
Difference in changes over time - - 0.392
II. Decomposition of difference in changes over time
(0.338 = 100.0) (0.392 = 100.0)
__________________________ __________________________
Weighting Weighting Weighting Weighting
scheme 1 scheme 2 scheme 1 scheme 2
A) Percentage explained by:
Permanent income 15.2 9.8 12.6 8.6
Transitory income 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
age -14.8 -10.3 -15.1 -10.4
education -1.5 -1.9 -0.1 -1.4
lone-parent status -0.1 1.8 -0.2 1.5
family size -1.9 0.2 -1.0 0.7
province 2.9 1.6 2.7 1.6
urban/rural status -1.8 -1.3 -1.4 -0.8
Total explained -2.0 -0.1 -2.5 -0.2
B) Percentage unexplained 102.0 100.1 102.5 100.2
C) Difference in changes over time 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Source : Authors' calculations from the Assets and Debts Survey of 1984 and the Survey of Financial Security of 1999.   43 
 
Table 14: Decomposition of the change in the wealth gap between low-wealth and high-wealth family units.
________________________________________________________________________________________________________
I. Average  wealth
1984 1999 Change Change
1984-99 1984-99
$$$ %
0-50th percentile 13,808 13,722 -86 -0.6
60-95th percentile 188,469 250,223 61,754 32.8
Wealth gap 174,661 236,501 61,840 35.4




scheme 1 scheme 2
A) Percentage explained by:
Permanent income 2.7 2.7
Transitory income 0.0 0.0
age 0.0 -0.1
education 3.7 1.5
lone-parent status 0.0 0.0
family size -0.2 -0.1
province 1.4 1.0
urban/rural status 0.0 0.3
Total explained 7.6 5.3
B) Percentage unexplained 92.4 94.7
C) Change in wealth gap 100.0 100.0
________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Source : Authors' calculations from the Assets and Debts Survey of 1984 and the Survey of Financial Security of 1999.   44 
 
Table 15: Decomposition of overall wealth inequality by wealth component, 1984 and 1999 - all family units.
__________________________________________________________________________________________________
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)




Deposits, non-RRSP - 0.773 0.114 0.741 0.065 9.5
Stocks, bonds and mutual funds, non-RRSP - 0.916 0.061 0.791 0.044 6.4
RRSPs / LIRAs - 0.889 0.044 0.755 0.029 4.3
Other investments or financial assets, non-RRSP - 0.970 0.028 0.773 0.021 3.0
Principal residence - 0.629 0.494 0.798 0.248 35.9
Real estate other than principal residence - 0.920 0.115 0.742 0.078 11.3
Vehicles - 0.610 0.065 0.525 0.021 3.0
Other assets - 0.987 0.002 0.586 0.001 0.2
Business equity - 0.963 0.246 0.933 0.221 32.0
Debts
Mortgage on principal residence - 0.833 0.100 0.250 0.021 -3.0
Other debt - 0.832 0.069 0.306 0.018 -2.5
Total 0.691 - - - - 100.0
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)




Deposits, non-RRSP - 0.825 0.075 0.747 0.046 6.3
Stocks, bonds and mutual funds, non-RRSP - 0.948 0.109 0.902 0.093 12.9
RRSPs / LIRAs - 0.823 0.159 0.827 0.109 14.9
Other investments or financial assets, non-RRSP - 0.966 0.020 0.761 0.014 2.0
Principal residence - 0.605 0.513 0.805 0.250 34.4
Real estate other than principal residence - 0.931 0.109 0.773 0.079 10.8
Vehicles - 0.635 0.058 0.590 0.022 3.0
Other assets - 0.990 0.004 0.885 0.004 0.5
Business equity - 0.985 0.165 0.928 0.151 20.7
Debts
Mortgage on principal residence - 0.794 0.141 0.224 0.025 -3.5
Other debt - 0.792 0.072 0.268 0.015 -2.1
Total 0.727 - - - - 100.0
__________________________________________________________________________________________________
Source : Authors' calculations from the Assets and Debts Survey of 1984 and the Survey of Financial Security of 1999.
- See text for definition of variables.   45 
 







x < 0 0.4 1.0 0.6
(0 < x < 10,000)  20.2 48.6 28.4
(10,000<= x < 20,000) 9.7 7.3 -2.4
(20,000<= x < 30,000) 4.7 5.4 0.7
(30,000<= x < 40,000) 7.7 3.1 -4.6
(40,000<= x < 50,000)  3.6 2.1 -1.5
(50,000<= x < 60,000) 2.5 3.4 0.9
(60,000<= x < 70,000) 3.3 1.8 -1.4
(70,000<= x < 80,000) 4.0 1.6 -2.4
(80,000<= x < 90,000) 1.3 1.1 -0.3
(90,000<= x < 100,000) 2.7 0.8 -1.9
(100000<= x < 500,000) 28.6 16.9 -11.7
(500000<= x <1,000,000) 7.7 3.8 -3.9
x >= 1,000,000 3.8 3.1 -0.7
Total 100.0 100.0 -
II. Shift-share analysis 
- Average business equity for family 
units with a business (1999 constant $): 224,086 155,610
- a) Hypothetical average business equity in 
1999 based on 1984 class-specific weights : - 231,206
- b) Hypothetical average business equity in 
1984 based on 1999 class-specific weights : 146,358 -
- Fraction of the decline in average business
equity accounted for by changes in the
distribution of businesses by net equity
classes :
 a) 1984 class-specific weights : 
(231,206-155,610)/(224,086-155,610) = 110.4%
 b) 1999 class-specific weights :
(224,086-146,358)/(224,086-155,610) = 113.5%
_______________________________________________________________________________________________________
Source : Assets and Debts Survey of 1984, Survey of Financial Security of 1999.
* Family units with non-zero business equity only.   46 
 
Table 17: Decomposition of the change in Gini coefficient by wealth component, 1984-1999.
_________________________________________________________________________________________________
(1) (2) (2)
All family  Top 1% of Top 5% of
units family units family units
excluded excluded
Contribution of each wealth component
to the change in Gini coefficient :
Wealth component
Assets
Deposits, non-RRSP -0.019 -0.016 -0.024
Stocks, bonds and mutual funds, non-RRSP 0.049 0.024 0.006
RRSPs / LIRAs 0.079 0.084 0.076
Other investments or financial assets, non-RRSP -0.006 -0.006 -0.002
Principal residence 0.001 0.011 0.020
Real estate other than principal residence 0.000 -0.004 -0.008
Vehicles 0.001 0.002 0.001
Other assets 0.002 0.000 0.000
Business equity -0.071 -0.060 -0.024
Debts
Mortgage on principal residence -0.004 -0.008 -0.011
Other debt 0.002 0.001 -0.002
Change in Gini coefficient between 
1984 and 1999 * 0.036 0.029 0.032
_________________________________________________________________________________________________
Source : Authors' calculations from the Assets and Debts Survey of 1984 and the Survey of Financial Security of 1999.
* The sum of contributions of wealth components may not add to the change in Gini coefficient due to rounding.   47 
 





I. All family units
A) Unit of analysis: family unit 0.691 0.727 5.2
(0.0062) (0.0057)
B) Unit of analysis: individuals 0.678 0.723 6.6
(0.0062) (0.0058)
II. Top 1% of family units excluded *
A) Unit of analysis: family unit 0.646 0.675 4.4
(0.0039) (0.0036)
B) Unit of analysis: individuals 0.635 0.674 6.2
(0.0042) (0.0039)
III. Top 5% of family units excluded *
A) Unit of analysis: family unit 0.605 0.637 5.4
(0.0042) (0.0039)
B) Unit of analysis: individuals 0.597 0.642 7.5
(0.0045) (0.0041)
____________________________________________________________________________________________________
Source : Authors' calculations from the Assets and Debts Survey of 1984 and Survey of Financial Security of 1999.
* After ranking family units by ascending order of their net worth.
** The standard errors for 1999 take account of the complex design of SFS 1999. The standard errors for 1984 are
obtained by multiplying the standard errors of 1999 by an adjustment factor of 1.08. See text for details.   48 
 
Appendix 1 - Table 2: Changes in wealth inequality, 1984-1999.
____________________________________________________________________________________________________
1984 1999 Change
I. Bottom 0.5% of family units excluded * 1984-1999
%
A) Unit of analysis: family unit
Gini 0.686 0.723 5.4
CV 2.311 3.130 35.4
Exponential 0.498 0.537 7.8
B) Unit of analysis: individuals
Gini 0.673 0.719 6.8
CV 2.375 3.089 30.1
Exponential 0.486 0.534 9.9
II. Bottom 0.5% and top 1% of family units excluded *
A) Unit of analysis: family unit
Gini 0.640 0.669 4.5
CV 1.416 1.505 6.3
Exponential 0.452 0.484 7.1
B) Unit of analysis: individuals
Gini 0.628 0.668 6.4
CV 1.503 1.627 8.3
Exponential 0.439 0.481 9.6
III. Bottom 0.5% and top 5% of family units excluded *
A) Unit of analysis: family unit
Gini 0.597 0.630 5.5
CV 1.153 1.239 7.5
Exponential 0.411 0.447 8.8
B) Unit of analysis: individuals
Gini 0.589 0.635 7.8
CV 1.249 1.382 10.6
Exponential 0.398 0.447 12.3
____________________________________________________________________________________________________
Source: Assets and Debts Survey of 1984, Survey of Financial Security of 1999.
* After ranking family units by ascending order of their net worth.   49 
 
Appendix 2 : Comparison of household surveys and National Accounts. 
 
In this appendix, we attempt to answer two questions. First, we ask whether the reporting of 
financial assets in household surveys—as compared to estimates of financial assets from 
national accounts—improved between 1984 and 1999. We show that this is the case.  
 
Since financial assets are held predominantly by rich family units, the better reporting of 
financial assets in 1999 than in 1984 could lead to an increase in measured wealth inequality, 
even if the true level of wealth inequality remained unchanged during the period considered. 
For this reason, we also ask whether the increase in wealth inequality documented in this paper 
for the 1984-1999 period could be simply due to the better reporting of financial assets in 1999 
than in 1984. The answer is that such a scenario is unlikely since most of the increase in wealth 
inequality remains even after taking into account the better reporting of financial assets in 1999.  
 
 
I. Has the reporting of financial assets improved between 1984 and 1999? 
 
The answer is yes. We define financial assets as including the four following components: 1) 
deposits in financial institutions, non-RRSPs, 2) RRSPs/LIRAs, 3) mutual funds, stocks, bonds, 
non-RRSPs and, 4) other financial assets, non-RRSPs. The first two columns of the following 
table compare estimates of financial assets from household surveys (the Assets and Debts 
Survey of 1984 and the Survey of Financial Security of 1999) to those derived from National 
Balance Sheet Accounts. The numbers are in millions of current dollars. The third column 




Appendix 2 - Table 1: Estimates of financial assets, household surveys and National Accounts.  
______________________________________________________________________________ 
Year     Household surveys  National Accounts    HS/NA 
1984    196,696    404,171         49% 
1999    780,832    1,183,802         66% 
________________________________________________________________________ 
Source: Assets and Debts Survey of 1984, Survey of Financial Security of 1999, National Balance Sheet 
Accounts, 1984 and 1999. 
 
Table 1 shows that in 1984, the estimates of financial assets obtained from household surveys 
amounted to 49% of those derived from National Accounts. The corresponding number rose to 
66% in 1999. Thus, based on National Accounts estimates, the reporting of financial assets in 
household surveys appears to have improved between 1984 and 1999.    50 
 
I.  Could the increase in wealth inequality measured between 1984 and 1999 simply be 
due to the better reporting of financial assets in 1999 than in 1984? 
 
We show that such a scenario is unlikely by correcting household surveys’s estimates of 
financial assets using two different methods. First, we simply apply a proportional correction, 
i.e. we multiply financial assets of each family unit by 100/49 in 1984 and by 100/66 in 1999 
and then recalculate the level of wealth inequality in both years.  
 
One criticism of this method is that it assumes that the degree of underreporting of financial 
assets is the same for all family units, whatever their true financial assets are. An alternative is 
to assume that wealthier family units are likely to underreport their financial assets to a greater 
extent than their poorer counterparts. Following Davies (1979), we assume the following: 
 
(A.1)     Âi   =  γ0Ai
γ1 ; 0 < γ1 < 1 
 
where Âi and Ai are the reported and true holdings of financial assets of family unit i and γ1 is 
the elasticity of reported holdings with respect to true holdings. This elasticity is smaller than 1, 
implying that a 10% increase in true financial assets will lead to a less than 10% increase in 
reported financial assets. To take into account the improvement in reporting of financial assets 
between 1984 and 1999, we assume γ1 =0.90 in 1984 and γ1 =0.95 in 1999. The constant γ0 is 
determined residually by imposing that: 
 
(A.2)     Σ Ai  =  c ΣÂi 
(1/γ1)  ;  c = (1/γ0 )
 (1/γ1) 
 
where Σ Ai are the total financial assets derived from National Accounts. Solving equation A.2 
for 1984 and 1999 yields values of c equal to 0.558 and 0.781, respectively. Appendix 2 Table 2  
shows the relationship between assumed true holdings and reported holdings implied by the 
aforementioned assumptions (i.e. γ1 =0.90 and c =0.558 in 1984; γ1 =0.95 and c = 0.781). 
 
Our assumptions imply that in 1984, families holding $1,203 in financial assets would report 
83.1% of these assets while families holding $2.591 millions would report only 38.6% of them. 
In 1999, our assumptions imply that families having $1,124 in financial assets would report 
89.0% of these assets while families holding $1.616 millions would report only 61.9% of them. 
Hence, these adjustments should produce a greater disequalizing effect in 1984 than in 1999.  
 
 Table 3 shows that most of the increase in the Gini coefficient measured in this study remain 
whether we apply proportional corrections or the non-linear adjustments defined in equation 
A.1. For instance, when all family units are considered, the increase in the Gini coefficient 
measured in this study equals 5.2% (from 0.691 to 0.727). When proportional corrections are 
implemented, the resulting increase equals 6.0%. When non-linear adjustments are applied, the 
resulting increase equals 4.8%. As a result, it is unlikely that the increase in wealth inequality 
documented in this paper is simply due to the fact that financial assets are better reported in 
1999 than they were in 1984.    51 
 
Appendix 2 - Table 2: Reported holdings and assumed true holdings of financial assets, 1984 and 1999.
_________________________________________________________________________________________________
1984 1999
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Reported Assumed (1)/(2) Reported Assumed (4)/(5)
holdings holdings holdings holdings
$$ % $$ %
1,000 1,203 83.1 1,000 1,124 89.0
2,000 2,599 77.0 2,000 2,331 85.8
4,000 5,613 71.3 4,000 4,835 82.7
5,000 7,193 69.5 5,000 6,115 81.8
8,000 12,125 66.0 8,000 10,030 79.8
10,000 15,537 64.4 10,000 12,685 78.8
16,000 26,192 61.1 16,000 20,805 76.9
20,000 33,562 59.6 20,000 26,313 76.0
40,000 72,497 55.2 40,000 54,581 73.3
50,000 92,896 53.8 50,000 69,033 72.4
100,000 200,667 49.8 100,000 143,195 69.8
200,000 433,464 46.1 200,000 297,032 67.3
500,000 1,199,800 41.7 500,000 779,268 64.2
1,000,000 2,591,711 38.6 1,000,000 1,616,444 61.9
50,000,000 200,138,672 25.0 50,000,000 99,300,216 50.4
_________________________________________________________________________________________________
Source: Authors' calculations from the Assets and Debts Survey of 1984 and the Survey of Financial Security of 1999.




I. All family units 1984-1999
Gini 0.691 0.727 5.2
Gini: proportional correction 0.688 0.729 6.0
Gini: non-linear correction 0.704 0.738 4.8
II. Top 1% of family units excluded *
Gini 0.646 0.675 4.4
Gini: proportional correction 0.647 0.677 4.6
Gini: non-linear correction 0.661 0.685 3.6
III. Top 5% of family units excluded *
Gini 0.605 0.637 5.4
Gini: proportional correction 0.604 0.635 5.1
Gini: non-linear correction 0.616 0.642 4.2
____________________________________________________________________________________________________
Source: Assets and Debts Survey of 1984, Survey of Financial Security of 1999.
* After ranking family units by ascending order of their net worth. Family units are the unit of analysis.
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Appendix 3: Results of wealth regressions. 
 
Table 1: 15-50
th percentile in 1984. 
Dependent variable: natural logarithm of wealth 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
log wealth      Coef.   Std. Err.       t     P>|t|       [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
   pminc |   .0221867   .0018938     11.715   0.000        .018474    .0258994 
  trninc |   .0211159   .0010271     20.559   0.000       .0191023    .0231295 
 age3044 |   .3452823   .0390892      8.833   0.000       .2686497    .4219148 
 age4554 |   .2899797   .0586215      4.947   0.000       .1750549    .4049044 
 age5564 |   .5163119   .0626441      8.242   0.000       .3935009    .6391228 
  age65p |   .3345664   .0499754      6.695   0.000       .2365919    .4325408 
medu_uni |   .1676975   .0516821      3.245   0.001       .0663771    .2690179 
fml_lone |  -.3651152   .0887869     -4.112   0.000      -.5391778   -.1910526 
 fam_siz |   .0290443   .0147617      1.968   0.049       .0001046     .057984 
      nf |   .3642319   .1095967      3.323   0.001       .1493726    .5790913 
     pei |   .0332994   .2370049      0.141   0.888      -.4313378    .4979366 
      ns |   .3081733   .0888606      3.468   0.001       .1339662    .4823804 
      nb |   .2313266   .0908837      2.545   0.011       .0531534    .4094998 
      pq |   .0058395   .0396107      0.147   0.883      -.0718154    .0834944 
      mn |   .0591582   .0829141      0.713   0.476       -.103391    .2217074 
    sask |   .0936302   .0865187      1.082   0.279      -.0759858    .2632462 
      ab |   .0230944   .0557673      0.414   0.679      -.0862348    .1324235 
      bc |  -.0854558   .0533465     -1.602   0.109      -.1900391    .0191275 
   urban |  -.3859912   .0458908     -8.411   0.000      -.4759581   -.2960244 
   _cons |   8.654597   .0778608    111.155   0.000       8.501955     8.80724 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 






th percentile in 1999. 
Dependent variable: natural logarithm of wealth 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
log wealth      Coef.   Std. Err.       t     P>|t|       [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
   pminc |   .0374619   .0028792     13.011   0.000       .0318175    .0431063 
  trninc |   .0274023   .0012259     22.353   0.000       .0249991    .0298056 
 age3044 |   .4658903   .0523221      8.904   0.000        .363317    .5684635 
 age4554 |   .4864759   .0634979      7.661   0.000       .3619935    .6109584 
 age5564 |   .3033456   .0793372      3.823   0.000       .1478116    .4588796 
  age65p |   .4043261   .0654002      6.182   0.000       .2761145    .5325377 
medu_uni |   .1504615   .0529082      2.844   0.004       .0467393    .2541836 
fml_lone |   .0273136   .0950369      0.287   0.774      -.1589984    .2136255 
 fam_siz |  -.0297761   .0201202     -1.480   0.139      -.0692202     .009668 
      nf |   .6560821   .1363466      4.812   0.000       .3887859    .9233783 
     pei |   .2209645   .2827462      0.781   0.435      -.3333361    .7752651 
      ns |   .3919666   .1094046      3.583   0.000       .1774878    .6064453 
      nb |    .373093   .1188408      3.139   0.002       .1401154    .6060706 
      pq |   .2795272   .0503712      5.549   0.000       .1807787    .3782757 
      mn |   .1790811   .0998997      1.793   0.073       -.016764    .3749262 
    sask |   .5080847   .1137112      4.468   0.000       .2851632    .7310061 
      ab |   .3586624   .0714412      5.020   0.000       .2186078     .498717 
      bc |   .1432192   .0626377      2.286   0.022       .0204231    .2660153 
   urban |  -.5095716   .0540306     -9.431   0.000      -.6154942   -.4036491 
   _cons |   7.949653   .1087409     73.106   0.000       7.736475    8.162831 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Adj. R squared: 0.1777 
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Appendix 3: Results of wealth regressions. 
 
Table 3: 50-85
th percentile in 1984. 
Dependent variable: natural logarithm of wealth 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
log wealth     Coef.   Std. Err.       t     P>|t|       [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
   pminc |   .0024367   .0006163      3.954   0.000       .0012284     .003645 
  trninc |   .0029347   .0002672     10.985   0.000       .0024109    .0034585 
 age3044 |   .0688431   .0182801      3.766   0.000        .033006    .1046801 
 age4554 |    .200293   .0197504     10.141   0.000       .1615735    .2390124 
 age5564 |   .2190192   .0200215     10.939   0.000       .1797683    .2582702 
  age65p |   .1600706   .0200104      7.999   0.000       .1208415    .1992997 
medu_uni |   .0518047   .0166178      3.117   0.002       .0192266    .0843827 
fml_lone |   .0231805    .037745      0.614   0.539      -.0508161    .0971771 
 fam_siz |   .0113447   .0043067      2.634   0.008       .0029016    .0197878 
      nf |  -.1245975   .0354777     -3.512   0.000      -.1941493   -.0550456 
     pei |  -.0624256   .0735836     -0.848   0.396      -.2066815    .0818303 
      ns |  -.0807286   .0273557     -2.951   0.003      -.1343577   -.0270995 
      nb |  -.1415523   .0321205     -4.407   0.000      -.2045225    -.078582 
      pq |  -.0710922   .0127383     -5.581   0.000      -.0960648   -.0461197 
      mn |    .010906   .0249265      0.438   0.662      -.0379609    .0597729 
    sask |   -.001176   .0268276     -0.044   0.965      -.0537697    .0514177 
      ab |    .026772   .0195357      1.370   0.171      -.0115264    .0650705 
      bc |    .060874   .0162563      3.745   0.000       .0290046    .0927434 
   urban |   .0139424   .0138495      1.007   0.314      -.0132087    .0410935 
   _cons |   11.35405   .0328048    346.109   0.000       11.28974    11.41837 






th percentile in 1999. 
Dependent variable: natural logarithm of wealth 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
log wealth      Coef.   Std. Err.       t     P>|t|       [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
   pminc |   .0028137   .0006677      4.214   0.000       .0015047    .0041228 
  trninc |   .0028298   .0002759     10.255   0.000       .0022888    .0033708 
 age3044 |   .1204945   .0278146      4.332   0.000       .0659669    .1750221 
 age4554 |   .2358201   .0285117      8.271   0.000       .1799259    .2917144 
 age5564 |   .2813692   .0304593      9.238   0.000       .2216569    .3410815 
  age65p |   .2908268     .02908     10.001   0.000       .2338185    .3478351 
medu_uni |   .0559606   .0155292      3.604   0.000       .0255172    .0864039 
fml_lone |  -.0598977    .044222     -1.354   0.176      -.1465904    .0267951 
 fam_siz |   .0099882   .0053823      1.856   0.064      -.0005633    .0205397 
      nf |  -.2222955   .0469682     -4.733   0.000      -.3143717   -.1302192 
     pei |  -.1324846   .0852666     -1.554   0.120       -.299641    .0346718 
      ns |   -.145084   .0328697     -4.414   0.000      -.2095217   -.0806462 
      nb |  -.2039393   .0357257     -5.708   0.000      -.2739759   -.1339026 
      pq |  -.1006497   .0151943     -6.624   0.000      -.1304365   -.0708629 
      mn |  -.0842947   .0295851     -2.849   0.004      -.1422932   -.0262962 
    sask |  -.0575143   .0310048     -1.855   0.064       -.118296    .0032675 
      ab |  -.0359699   .0197525     -1.821   0.069      -.0746926    .0027529 
      bc |   .0221133    .018296      1.209   0.227      -.0137542    .0579808 
   urban |    .017941   .0145166      1.236   0.217      -.0105174    .0463993 
   _cons |   11.48715   .0417876    274.894   0.000       11.40523    11.56907 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Adj. R squared: 0.0838 
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Appendix 3: Results of wealth regressions. 
 
Table 5: 60-95
th percentile in 1984. 
Dependent variable: natural logarithm of wealth 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
log wealth      Coef.   Std. Err.       t     P>|t|       [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
   pminc |   .0035428    .000757      4.680   0.000       .0020587    .0050269 
  trninc |   .0042901   .0002737     15.676   0.000       .0037536    .0048266 
 age3044 |  -.0144035   .0238265     -0.605   0.546      -.0611139    .0323069 
 age4554 |   .1183562   .0248209      4.768   0.000       .0696962    .1670162 
 age5564 |   .1166593   .0253629      4.600   0.000       .0669369    .1663818 
  age65p |   .0326469   .0258109      1.265   0.206      -.0179539    .0832478 
medu_uni |   .0534804    .020512      2.607   0.009       .0132677    .0936931 
fml_lone |   .0248866   .0471816      0.527   0.598      -.0676102    .1173835 
 fam_siz |   .0030713    .005011      0.613   0.540      -.0067525     .012895 
      nf |  -.2197423   .0484445     -4.536   0.000      -.3147149   -.1247697 
     pei |   .0262429   .0904606      0.290   0.772      -.1510999    .2035858 
      ns |  -.1441876   .0354574     -4.066   0.000      -.2136999   -.0746753 
      nb |  -.2030822   .0436618     -4.651   0.000      -.2886786   -.1174858 
      pq |  -.1107416   .0157708     -7.022   0.000      -.1416594   -.0798238 
      mn |  -.0280903   .0290291     -0.968   0.333      -.0850002    .0288196 
    sask |   .0375409    .030402      1.235   0.217      -.0220604    .0971422 
      ab |   .0240272   .0221658      1.084   0.278      -.0194276     .067482 
      bc |   .0556996   .0178664      3.118   0.002       .0206737    .0907256 
   urban |  -.0735756    .017077     -4.308   0.000      -.1070541    -.040097 
   _cons |   11.86798   .0425823    278.707   0.000        11.7845    11.95146 






th percentile in 1999. 
Dependent variable: natural logarithm of wealth 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
log wealth     Coef.   Std. Err.       t     P>|t|       [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
   pminc |   .0030963   .0006371      4.860   0.000       .0018474    .0043452 
  trninc |   .0034396   .0002634     13.061   0.000       .0029233    .0039559 
 age3044 |  -.0358556   .0371553     -0.965   0.335      -.1086947    .0369835 
 age4554 |    .094153   .0376603      2.500   0.012       .0203238    .1679822 
 age5564 |   .1728812   .0392939      4.400   0.000       .0958495    .2499129 
  age65p |   .0835896   .0385381      2.169   0.030       .0080398    .1591395 
medu_uni |   .1012741   .0172658      5.866   0.000       .0674263    .1351219 
fml_lone |   .0398106   .0566165      0.703   0.482      -.0711802    .1508014 
 fam_siz |  -.0001187    .005805     -0.020   0.984      -.0114988    .0112614 
      nf |  -.2478435   .0661972     -3.744   0.000      -.3776164   -.1180707 
     pei |  -.0254419   .0954381     -0.267   0.790      -.2125385    .1616547 
      ns |  -.1977897    .039518     -5.005   0.000      -.2752607   -.1203188 
      nb |  -.2526865   .0472889     -5.343   0.000      -.3453916   -.1599815 
      pq |  -.1224998   .0169743     -7.217   0.000      -.1557761   -.0892234 
      mn |  -.1224363   .0338049     -3.622   0.000      -.1887072   -.0561654 
    sask |  -.0073641   .0342131     -0.215   0.830      -.0744354    .0597071 
      ab |  -.0597597   .0211554     -2.825   0.005      -.1012326   -.0182868 
      bc |   .0493757   .0186585      2.646   0.008       .0127976    .0859539 
   urban |  -.0140786   .0163634     -0.860   0.390      -.0461574    .0180001 
   _cons |   12.09509   .0477822    253.130   0.000       12.00142    12.18876 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Adj. R squared: 0.0977    55 
 
Appendix 3: Results of wealth regressions. 
 
Table 7: 0-50
th percentile in 1984. 
Dependent variable: level of wealth 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
  wealth |      Coef.   Std. Err.       t     P>|t|       [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
   pminc |   .3498721   .0284788     12.285   0.000       .2940449    .4056994 
  trninc |   .3245659   .0159748     20.317   0.000       .2932503    .3558815 
 age3044 |   4.800044    .597768      8.030   0.000       3.628233    5.971855 
 age4554 |   5.105988   .8998946      5.674   0.000       3.341914    6.870062 
 age5564 |   8.164914    .982049      8.314   0.000       6.239792    10.09004 
  age65p |   9.338456   .7893162     11.831   0.000        7.79115    10.88576 
medu_uni |   .7416383   .8328225      0.891   0.373      -.8909532     2.37423 
fml_lone |  -4.002508   1.103774     -3.626   0.000      -6.166249   -1.838767 
 fam_siz |   .3091336   .2441315      1.266   0.205      -.1694401    .7877073 
      nf |   6.606709   1.811327      3.647   0.000       3.055944    10.15747 
     pei |   .0574538   3.733711      0.015   0.988      -7.261784    7.376691 
      ns |   2.896578   1.365837      2.121   0.034       .2191122    5.574044 
      nb |   3.689811   1.440602      2.561   0.010       .8657813     6.51384 
      pq |   .7272698   .6107081      1.191   0.234      -.4699084    1.924448 
      mn |   .2369354   1.287487      0.184   0.854      -2.286941    2.760812 
    sask |   .3068983   1.374993      0.223   0.823      -2.388516    3.002312 
      ab |   -1.00578   .8629956     -1.165   0.244       -2.69752    .6859602 
      bc |  -1.956155    .823638     -2.375   0.018      -3.570742   -.3415681 
   urban |  -5.747106   .7582843     -7.579   0.000      -7.233579   -4.260632 
   _cons |    3.23627   1.137766      2.844   0.004       1.005894    5.466647 






th percentile in 1999. 
Dependent variable: level of wealth 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
  wealth |      Coef.   Std. Err.       t     P>|t|       [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
   pminc |   .4708346   .0420344     11.201   0.000       .3884351    .5532341 
  trninc |   .3918934   .0183124     21.400   0.000       .3559958    .4277909 
 age3044 |   8.353278    .714494     11.691   0.000       6.952663    9.753892 
 age4554 |    10.2766   .9067375     11.334   0.000        8.49913    12.05406 
 age5564 |   10.37684   1.150686      9.018   0.000       8.121162    12.63251 
  age65p |   12.71457   .9588784     13.260   0.000       10.83489    14.59425 
medu_uni |   1.221919   .7909522      1.545   0.122      -.3285753    2.772413 
fml_lone |  -.7080581   1.231748     -0.575   0.565      -3.122639    1.706522 
 fam_siz |  -1.044826   .3067843     -3.406   0.001      -1.646212   -.4434407 
      nf |   4.233907   1.977445      2.141   0.032       .3575447    8.110269 
     pei |   .3940717   4.074959      0.097   0.923      -7.594022    8.382166 
      ns |   2.528739   1.582115      1.598   0.110      -.5726633    5.630141 
      nb |   2.811627   1.747158      1.609   0.108      -.6133072     6.23656 
      pq |   3.191743   .7270417      4.390   0.000       1.766532    4.616955 
      mn |   3.473622   1.494306      2.325   0.020       .5443525    6.402892 
    sask |   4.725507   1.669887      2.830   0.005       1.452047    7.998968 
      ab |   3.903427   1.048232      3.724   0.000       1.848589    5.958264 
      bc |  -.0245937   .8941237     -0.028   0.978      -1.777334    1.728147 
   urban |  -9.712621   .8490927    -11.439   0.000      -11.37709   -8.048155 
   _cons |   .1748549   1.544271      0.113   0.910      -2.852361    3.202071 
Adj. R squared: 0.1363    56 
 
Appendix 3: Results of wealth regressions. 
 
Table 9: 60-95
th percentile in 1984. 
Dependent variable: level of wealth 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
  wealth |      Coef.   Std. Err.       t     P>|t|       [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
   pminc |   .7585538   .1543251      4.915   0.000       .4560082    1.061099 
  trninc |   .8870953   .0557887     15.901   0.000       .7777248    .9964658 
 age3044 |   -5.49289   4.857183     -1.131   0.258      -15.01512     4.02934 
 age4554 |   18.51379   5.059911      3.659   0.000       8.594129    28.43346 
 age5564 |   18.99201   5.170389      3.673   0.000       8.855756    29.12826 
  age65p |   3.394992   5.261731      0.645   0.519      -6.920332    13.71032 
medu_uni |   11.01735   4.181518      2.635   0.008       2.819723    19.21498 
fml_lone |   3.664457   9.618286      0.381   0.703      -15.19164    22.52056 
 fam_siz |   .3713991   1.021527      0.364   0.716      -1.631246    2.374044 
      nf |   -39.6938   9.875729     -4.019   0.000       -59.0546     -20.333 
     pei |   5.738772     18.441      0.311   0.756      -30.41376     41.8913 
      ns |   -27.4935   7.228239     -3.804   0.000      -41.66405   -13.32295 
      nb |  -35.34047   8.900744     -3.971   0.000      -52.78987   -17.89107 
      pq |  -19.62594   3.214991     -6.105   0.000      -25.92875   -13.32313 
      mn |  -7.327738   5.917775     -1.238   0.216       -18.9292    4.273722 
    sask |   10.08098   6.197644      1.627   0.104      -2.069147    22.23111 
      ab |   4.394626   4.518646      0.973   0.331      -4.463921    13.25317 
      bc |   13.17606   3.642176      3.618   0.000       6.035785    20.31634 
   urban |  -17.44947   3.481268     -5.012   0.000      -24.27429   -10.62464 
   _cons |   154.6713   8.680679     17.818   0.000       137.6533    171.6893 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 





th percentile in 1999. 
Dependent variable: level of wealth 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
  wealth |      Coef.   Std. Err.       t     P>|t|       [95% Conf. Interval] 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
   pminc |   .8034397   .1702235      4.720   0.000       .4697342    1.137145 
  trninc |   .8763218   .0703692     12.453   0.000       .7383703    1.014273 
 age3044 |  -10.13622   9.927928     -1.021   0.307      -29.59889    9.326456 
 age4554 |   19.80937   10.06287      1.969   0.049       .0821578    39.53659 
 age5564 |    42.8498   10.49937      4.081   0.000       22.26688    63.43273 
  age65p |    18.1848    10.2974      1.766   0.077      -2.002196    38.37179 
medu_uni |   26.57886   4.613436      5.761   0.000        17.5347    35.62302 
fml_lone |   8.274136   15.12798      0.547   0.584      -21.38269    37.93096 
 fam_siz |   .1834521   1.551098      0.118   0.906      -2.857314    3.224219 
      nf |  -60.18116   17.68796     -3.402   0.001      -94.85657   -25.50576 
     pei |  -1.554441   25.50115     -0.061   0.951       -51.5468    48.43792 
      ns |  -49.12499   10.55924     -4.652   0.000      -69.82529   -28.42468 
      nb |  -59.92769   12.63565     -4.743   0.000      -84.69856   -35.15681 
      pq |  -29.45826   4.535551     -6.495   0.000      -38.34973   -20.56678 
      mn |  -30.33054   9.032685     -3.358   0.001      -48.03818    -12.6229 
    sask |    2.90914   9.141767      0.318   0.750      -15.01235    20.83063 
      ab |  -12.45633    5.65273     -2.204   0.028      -23.53792   -1.374737 
      bc |   15.03432    4.98558      3.016   0.003       5.260608    24.80803 
   urban |   -4.69943    4.37231     -1.075   0.283      -13.27089     3.87203 
   _cons |   194.5973   12.76743     15.242   0.000        169.568    219.6265 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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Appendix 4 - Table 1: Decomposition of overall wealth inequality by wealth component, 1984 and 1999 
- top 1% of family units excluded.
__________________________________________________________________________________________________
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)




Deposits, non-RRSP - 0.762 0.126 0.723 0.070 10.8
Stocks, bonds and mutual funds, non-RRSP - 0.909 0.062 0.767 0.044 6.7
RRSPs / LIRAs - 0.889 0.050 0.749 0.033 5.1
Other investments or financial assets, non-RRSP - 0.968 0.026 0.727 0.018 2.9
Principal residence - 0.621 0.567 0.793 0.279 43.2
Real estate other than principal residence - 0.917 0.123 0.722 0.082 12.6
Vehicles - 0.607 0.076 0.511 0.024 3.6
Other assets - 0.988 0.002 0.557 0.001 0.2
Business equity - 0.957 0.163 0.879 0.137 21.2
Debts
Mortgage on principal residence - 0.832 0.118 0.249 0.024 -3.8
Other debt - 0.826 0.078 0.263 0.017 -2.6
Total 0.646 - - - - 100.0
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)




Deposits, non-RRSP - 0.821 0.089 0.742 0.054 8.0
Stocks, bonds and mutual funds, non-RRSP - 0.932 0.086 0.849 0.068 10.0
RRSPs / LIRAs - 0.813 0.178 0.809 0.117 17.4
Other investments or financial assets, non-RRSP - 0.961 0.018 0.695 0.012 1.8
Principal residence - 0.596 0.613 0.793 0.290 43.0
Real estate other than principal residence - 0.926 0.114 0.733 0.077 11.5
Vehicles - 0.630 0.071 0.574 0.026 3.8
Other assets - 0.990 0.002 0.693 0.001 0.2
Business equity - 0.990 0.092 0.844 0.077 11.4
Debts
Mortgage on principal residence - 0.792 0.177 0.229 0.032 -4.8
Other debt - 0.785 0.086 0.233 0.016 -2.3
Total 0.674 - - - - 100.0
__________________________________________________________________________________________________
Source: Authors' calculations from the Assets and Debts Survey of 1984 and the Survey of Financial Security of 1999.
- See text for definition of variables.
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Appendix 4 - Table 2: Decomposition of overall wealth inequality by wealth component, 1984 and 1999 
- top 5% of family units excluded.
__________________________________________________________________________________________________
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)




Deposits, non-RRSP - 0.752 0.141 0.707 0.075 12.4
Stocks, bonds and mutual funds, non-RRSP - 0.901 0.057 0.714 0.037 6.1
RRSPs / LIRAs - 0.888 0.050 0.722 0.032 5.4
Other investments or financial assets, non-RRSP - 0.966 0.020 0.603 0.012 2.0
Principal residence - 0.615 0.661 0.787 0.320 52.9
Real estate other than principal residence - 0.915 0.120 0.670 0.073 12.1
Vehicles - 0.605 0.092 0.499 0.028 4.6
Other assets - 0.988 0.002 0.459 0.001 0.2
Business equity - 0.965 0.096 0.776 0.072 11.9
Debts
Mortgage on principal residence - 0.831 0.151 0.268 0.034 -5.6
Other debt - 0.813 0.089 0.167 0.012 -2.0
Total 0.604 - - - - 100.0
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)




Deposits, non-RRSP - 0.801 0.091 0.696 0.051 8.0
Stocks, bonds and mutual funds, non-RRSP - 0.921 0.061 0.761 0.043 6.7
RRSPs / LIRAs - 0.797 0.177 0.766 0.108 17.0
Other investments or financial assets, non-RRSP - 0.960 0.017 0.613 0.010 1.6
Principal residence - 0.594 0.731 0.782 0.340 53.4
Real estate other than principal residence - 0.927 0.106 0.662 0.065 10.2
Vehicles - 0.627 0.086 0.547 0.029 4.6
Other assets - 0.990 0.001 0.527 0.001 0.1
Business equity - 1.018 0.062 0.757 0.048 7.6
Debts
Mortgage on principal residence - 0.787 0.229 0.246 0.044 -7.0
Other debt - 0.773 0.104 0.170 0.014 -2.1
Total 0.637 - - - - 100.0
__________________________________________________________________________________________________
Source: Authors' calculations from the Assets and Debts Survey of 1984 and the Survey of Financial Security of 1999.
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